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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Sean F. McEnroe for the Master of Arts in History 
presented October 31, 2001. 
Title: Oregon Soldiers and the Portland Press in the Philippine Wars of 1898 and 
1899: How Oregonians Defined the Race of Filipinos and the Mission of 
America 
Oregon volunteer soldiers fought two wars in the Philippines from 1898 to 
1899, one against the Spanish colonial government (from May to August 1898), and 
one against the Philippine insurgency (beginning in February of1899). This thesis 
examines the connections between Oregonians' racial characterization of Filipinos and 
their beliefs about the wars' purposes and moral characteristics. The source material is 
drawn from the personal papers of Oregon volunteer soldiers and from the Portland 
Oregonian. 
Writers for the Oregonian understood the war against Spain in reference to two 
notions of American greatness: one of ideological greatness based on America's 
revolutionary origins, and one of racial greatness based on the story of Anglo-Saxon 
expansion and rule in North America. As the U.S. troops' activities shifted from 
fighting the Spanish Empire to conquering the Philippines, the ideological vision of 
America's identity and mission disappeared. It was replaced by two competing racial 
conceptions of Anglo-Saxon greatness: one of America as the inheritor of Great 
Britain's responsibilities as benevolent colonial ruler; the other of Anglo-Saxon 
triumph in a global struggle for survival between the races. The newspaper's racial 
characterization of the Filipinos paralleled these shifts in world-view, culminating in 
the notion of "Indian war." 
Oregon soldiers did not understand the wars in the Philippines as political or 
ideological struggles. For them, the war was a continuation of the European-American 
expansion and rule that had tamed the American West. During the period of 
cooperation with the Philippine insurgency, Oregon soldiers recorded a variety of 
racial attitudes toward the Filipinos-sometimes affectionate and paternalistic, 
sometimes ambivalent, and sometimes hostile. They categorized the race of locals as 
"asiatic," "negro," or "native" depending on their attitudes toward them. However, 
once the Oregon soldiers came face to face with Filipinos as enemies, they invariably 
described them as "Indians" or "Niggers." They came to understand the fight as a race 
war against Filipino soldiers and civilians, and one in which few codes of ethical 
conduct applied. 
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I. An Introduction to the Philippine Wars 
Between the spring of 1898 and the spring of 1902, the United States waged two wars 
in the Philippines. It is difficult to summarize these tum-of-the-century struggles in 
terms that are both accurate and concise. In the parlance of the time, the fight against 
the Spanish at Manila was merely one operation in "the War with Spain," while the 
subsequent fight against Philippine nationalists was referred to as the suppression of 
"the Philippine Insurrection." Though they are sometimes conflated in popular 
memory as elements of the Spanish-American War, these were two separate wars with 
different adversaries and different objectives. 
The first wave of American infantry to land in the Philippines was sent to 
capture Manila and thus weaken Spain in its struggle with the U.S. over Cuba. In this, 
the Americans soldiers were aided by an informal alliance with the native Philippine 
insurgency, which, like the Cuban rebel army, was fighting for independence from the 
Spanish Empire. However, within six months, the same American soldiers found 
themselves at war with their recent Filipino allies. The following summary of events 
describes the changing military and diplomatic relationships between Spain, the 
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United States, and the Filipinos, as well as the changing role assigned to the American 
soldiers from the spring of 1898 to the summer of 1899. 
Few observers were surprised on April 11, 1898 when President McKinley 
made his request to Congress for a declaration of war against Spain. America's 
grievances against Spain were not new, and the question of U.S. intervention in the 
Spanish-Cuban conflict had been a matter of public debate during the three years since 
the Cuban Rebellion had begun. The declaration of war was passed on April 21, and 
two days later, McKinley issued a proclamation calling for volunteer soldiers. Those 
who enlisted were joining a popular cause, and one that had been clearly articulated by 
the president. In his war message to Congress, McKinley emphasized the following 
objectives: stopping the "barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries" of 
the Spanish war in Cuba; protecting the lives and property of American citizens; and 
safeguarding peaceful commerce in the region.1 McKinley made no mention of the 
Philippines, and few of the eager conscripts could have anticipated that they might 
serve there. 
In Portland, Oregon, a multitude of young men from around the state 
converged to enlist in the Volunteer Army. Most were members of the Oregon 
National Guard, but since National Guard units could not be deployed abroad, 
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volunteers were reenlisted and reorganized as the Second Oregon U.S. Volunteer 
Infantry.2 While National Guard units across the nation assembled for the same 
purpose, America's Pacific fleet, under the command of Commodore George Dewey, 
carried out an existing plan to weaken Spain by striking at her fleet in the Philippines. 
When word of Dewey's dramatic victory at Manila Bay reached the United States, the 
Oregon Volunteers were already drilling at a hastily constructed army camp in 
Portland. Not until May 3 did the Portland Oregonian suggest that the deployment of 
the state's volunteers to the Philippines was likely.3 
Within two weeks, the Oregonians had been transported by train to the West 
Coast's Volunteer Army camp in San Francisco; by the end of the month, they were 
already at sea, bound for the Philippines. After a lavish reception by American 
annexationists in Hawaii, and the uneventful capture of a Spanish fortress in Guam, 
the Oregonians arrived at Manila Bay on June 30, 1898. Even before landing, the 
soldiers could glimpse the complex situation confronting them. The wreckage of the 
Spanish fleet was still visible, and Dewey's ships blockaded the Spanish port. 
American regulars who had sailed with Dewey had established a beachhead to the 
south of Manila at Cavite, and the army of the Philippine independence movement 
besieged Manila from the north. As the volunteers entered the bay, an exchange of fire 
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between the Spanish and the Philippine insurgency was visible.4 It was clear to all 
concerned that the American troops would serve at the intersection of two wars: one 
between Spain and the United States, and another between the Filipinos and their 
Spanish rulers. 
In the Philippines, as in Cuba, the struggle between the native insurgency and 
Spanish colonial forces had long preceded the American attack. A reformist 
nationalism among Filipino and mestizo elites had become a significant political force 
in the early 1890s, but in 1896 a more radical nationalism was advanced by the new 
Katipunan Party, which appealed to a broader segment of the population and 
organized its members for a war of independence. In August of 1896, a guerilla war 
commenced between the Spanish and the Katipuneros.5 By December of 1897, the 
poorly equipped rebels found themselves at a significant disadvantage even as the 
Spanish wearied of the war. The result was a negotiated settlement in which the 
insurgent leaders agreed to disarm their followers and accept exile in exchange for a 
cash payment.6 These leaders (sometimes later referred to as the Hong Kong Junta) 
departed to Hong Kong where they sought to arrange arms purchases and gain 
recognition and assistance from friendly nations. 
McEnroe 5 
In March of 1898, as the Hong Kong Junta solicited aid from abroad, its 
supporters in Luzon and the Visayan Islands to the south renewed the war at home. 
The coincidence of these events with the escalation of diplomatic conflict between 
Spain and the United States over Cuba created a sudden convergence of interests 
between American military planing and the Hong Kong Junta's revolutionary 
ambitions. Within a few days of America's declaration of war, the U.S. consul in 
Singapore, E. Spencer Pratt, met with the junta's chief military commander, Emilio 
Aguinaldo. Pratt and the American consul in Hong Kong, Rounseville Wildman, in 
consultation with Admiral Dewey, arranged to conduct arms purchases for the 
Filipinos and to transport the junta to Luzon.7 
The junta leaders arrived in Luzon after Dewey's naval victory. Their 
leadership, along with a supply of captured Spanish arms furnished by the Americans, 
contributed to an already substantial uprising that now drew additional strength from 
deserters who left the ranks of Spain's native infantry units for the rebel lines. When 
the Oregon soldiers arrived, as part of an American volunteer force under General 
Thomas Anderson, they found themselves spectators to a simultaneous American 
naval blockade and Philippine siege against the Spanish forces in Manila. 
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During the Month of July, more reinforcements arrived from the United States, 
and the American Army entrenched itself outside the city walls. The Philippine and 
American armies now faced the same adversary, but with conflicting objectives. On 
June 12, the rebel leaders had issued a declaration of independence from Spain, and on 
July 24, they began organizing a republic. They sought to expel the Spanish with the 
assistance of the United States and to exercise sovereignty throughout the islands. Yet, 
U.S. commanders were still conducting a war against Spain, and their objective was to 
occupy the enemy's colonial capital. On the eve of the U.S. attack on Manila, the 
American commanders delivered a warning to Aguinaldo that any attempt by the latter 
to occupy the city would be met with force. 8 
After negotiations between Admiral Dewey and Spanish Governor Don Fermin 
Jaudenes, the city was surrendered with a token fight on August 13. Ironically, by the 
time American soldiers marched through the gates, diplomats in Paris had already 
signed an armistice suspending the wars in Cuba and the Philippines. Though the 
Philippine Army had held Manila under siege for months, Dewey denied it entrance. 
In the months that followed, great uncertainty surrounded the conflicting claims of 
Spain, the United States, and the emergent Philippine Republic. The terms of the 
Spanish-American armistice left the U.S. in possession of Manila until the peace 
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conference reached a final agreement on the fate of the Philippines. The Philippine 
army, which claimed to operate under the mandate of the new republic, remained 
encamped on the outskirts of Manila and awaited acceptance of Philippine rule. The 
American troops within the walls had become the occupying authority in a large and 
troubled city. They carried out municipal functions while awaiting word from Paris. 
They guarded the perimeter of the city against any move by the Philippine army and 
policed its streets to suppress any internal uprising.9 
This tense and ambiguous confrontation between the U.S. and Philippine 
armies continued as the Spanish-American peace talks dragged on. Then, on 
December 12, a peace treaty ceding all of the Philippines to the United State was 
signed. Yet, the ratification of the treaty still required approval by the U.S. Senate. In 
the meantime, both armies at Manila waited, aware that the passage of the treaty 
would leave the United States and the Philippine Republic in a diplomatic and military 
deadlock, with both claiming absolute sovereignty. In the rest of the Philippines, the 
nationalist forces (which were not represented at the peace talks) continued to carry 
out their war against Spanish positions outside the area of U.S. occupation. 
By January, tensions between the two armies at Manila were high. They 
gathered intelligence and tested each other's resolve in a variety of minor incidents. 
-1 
McEnroe 8 
On the neighboring island of Panay, U.S. vessels at the harbor of Iloilo were at an 
impasse with Philippine soldiers who refused to permit them to land and occupy the 
Spanish citadel. In Manila, American soldiers were called to arms in a series of false 
alarms, while growing numbers of the city's residents crossed the American lines to 
join their countrymen. Late at night on February 4, 1899, a scuffle between U.S. 
sentries and Filipino soldiers erupted into a full-scale battle that initiated a new war. 
As this second war commenced in the Philippines, the U.S. Senate was 
concluding its debate on the terms of peace with Spain. On February 6, 1899 the Paris 
treaty was ratified. The Spanish and U.S. governments had now both approved 
American annexation of the Philippines; however, from the city of Malolos in Luzon, 
Filipino leaders claimed to speak for a national republic now engaged in a defensive 
war against American conquest. 10 The American soldiers followed up the first night's 
battle with a steady advance. The U.S. military continued to govern the native 
population of Manila while attempting to clear the surrounding suburbs and villages of 
the enemy. These soldiers, most of whom had seen only one day of combat against the 
Spanish, were now thrust into a much bigger war. 
The new war placed the American volunteers in an unanticipated military 
position; it also left their superiors in the War Department with legal and practical 
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difficulties. The terms of enlistment for volunteer soldiers limited their service to the 
duration of the war. Technically, once the ratified treaty with Spain went into effect, 
the soldiers that had volunteered in the spring of 1898 would have to be released. Yet, 
with a new war on their hands, American commanders could not afford to discharge 
the volunteers, who comprised the majority of the army, until a new wave of recruits 
arrived to relieve them. 
The Oregon Volunteers served in Manila during the first weeks of the war, but 
later fought along the Pasig River, in the northern campaign to capture the Philippine 
capital at Malolos, and in several engagements close to Manila. With the summer 
monsoon season bringing most operations to a halt, and replacement troops arriving 
from the U.S., the Oregon Volunteers were permitted to depart the Philippines on June 
12 and 13, 1899. They were mustered out in San Francisco on August 7, and most 
reached their homes in Oregon within a few days. Yet, in the Philippines, the war 
continued. The Philippine nationalists continued to resist occupation by keeping a 
regular army in the field until December of 1899. Thereafter, the conflict became a 
collection of simultaneous, regional guerilla wars. Even the capture and capitulation of 
the Philippine president in March of 1901 did not bring the war to an end. Until the 
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spring of 1902, fighting continued on the island of Samar and in the Batangas region 
of Luzon. 
The Spanish-American and Philippine Wars were the United States' first 
substantial transoceanic military projects. Any study of the period offers remarkable 
opportunities for exploring American attitudes on expansion, colonialism, race, and 
national destiny at the close of the nineteenth century. Many histories of these wars 
have focused on the intellectual trends that influenced America's entry into the war 
against Spain, and that informed debates over the annexation of the Philippines. Far 
fewer have investigated the psychological and intellectual responses of the soldiers 
and the general public to the Philippine Wars.11 
In the late nineteenth century, the expansion of U.S. economic power, 
diplomatic influence, and hemispheric authority was stunning. The trends in 
economic, political, and military thinking reflected this growth. Much has been written 
on the influence of contemporary notions of market expansion, naval security, and 
racial Darwinism on America's ambitions in these wars. However, most academic 
work has focused on the history of these ideas within academic and political circles. 
This study of the Philippine war does not address intellectual trends among academic 
and policy elites or speculate on connections between popular sentiment and national 
McEnroe 11 
policy. It seeks merely to characterize the responses of one regional community to 
America's activities in the Philippines. 
The Philippine War was fought largely by volunteers-men who offered their 
services freely, and whose duties in the military were an interruption, not a 
renunciation, of normal professional and civic lives. The Oregon Volunteers were 
among the first Americans sent to the islands, and they were asked to execute a series 
of very different policies during their year of service. They first fought against the 
Spanish in loose alliance with the Philippine nationalists; they then occupied Manila 
when U.S. claims over the islands were uncertain; and, in the end, they fought to wrest 
control of Luzon from the emerging Philippine government. Because these volunteers 
were ordinary citizens before the war, but immediate observers and participants in the 
war, the record of their reflections on these events is especially valuable. The personal 
papers of the Oregon soldiers reveal to us ordinary citizens' expectations about 
America's international mission; they also reveal how the experience of war shaped 
the soldiers' understanding of themselves and their nation in contrast to their 
adversaries. 
This thesis draws on two pools of source material: the personal papers of 
Oregon soldiers, and the daily coverage and commentary on the war in the Portland 
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Oregonian. As the state's largest and most influential paper, the Oregonian provides a 
record of the information available to Oregonians about the war abroad. It shows us 
how Oregonians were given to understand America's role in the world before the war, 
and how that understanding evolved while the Oregon Volunteers served in the 
Philippines. The points of continuity between the soldiers' and the Oregonian's 
accounts of the war reveal the shared assumptions of Americans from their time and 
region. The points of contrast between the soldiers' and journalists' reactions to events 
and policy indicate the ways in which the experience of combat and occupation 
. reshaped the volunteers' understanding of their personal and national missions. 
Portland newspapermen and Oregon soldiers described the Philippine Wars 
according to current notions of nationality, race, and political identity. They saw 
America's distant military projects as a sign of the nation's great destiny. Naturally, 
they sought to understand the United States in reference to its own past, and in 
comparison to the world's other great powers. 
Looking back from the 1890s, Americans could make two impressive claims 
about their own history: On one hand, they were the originators of a successful 
experiment in revolutionary republicanism; on the other, they were the conquerors of a 
vast continent. In some quarters, America's fight against the Spanish Empire, 
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alongside Cuban and Filipino republicans, may have appealed to the old revolutionary 
image of the United States, but for the Oregonians at home and abroad, the romance of 
the republic was soon displaced by a metanarrative borrowed from the conquest of the 
western frontier. 
During the war against Spain, the Oregonian sometimes described the conflict, 
in political terms, as a struggle against a tyrannical empire. The Cubans and Filipinos 
were sometimes presented in a favorable light as partners in the good fight. However, 
once the Spanish were beaten, the Oregonian' s treatment of the Philippines and its 
people changed. The islands, now nominally in the hands of the United States, were 
described as an unsettled frontier, and its inhabitants as Indians. With the conquest of 
the West now carried across the sea, America's great destiny became both territorial 
and racial. In seeking a place for America among the great powers, the Oregonian 
recast America as the inheritor of England's racial and cultural mission. The 
Philippines became the new frontier; and America became the new British Empire. 
When Oregonians volunteered for war in the spring of 1898, they did so out 
patriotism and personal ambition, but not political conviction. Unlike the Oregonian, 
they wasted little time dispensing with ideological objections to foreign conquest. 
Even before their mission shifted from defeating the Spanish to defeating the 
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Filipinos, the soldiers had come to understand the local population in terms of race and 
the land as a frontier. To some extent, the shifts in thinking among the troops 
paralleled the changing editorial outlook of the Oregon. Yet, the position of a writer in 
Portland was fundamentally different from that of a soldiers in field. While 
editorialists communicated a mixture of paternalism and hostility in describing the 
Filipinos, the soldiers on campaign evinced no sign of the former and gave themselves 
over entirely to the latter. They saw their enemies sometimes as Blacks, and 
sometimes as Indians, but their analysis of the conflict was usually the same. In either 
case, they understood their personal struggle to survive as part of a global, racial 
struggle for survival and dominance. Often, this led them to embrace the 
extermination not just of the known enemy, but of the entire native population. 
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II. The Cuban and Philippine Rebellions 
Viewed through the Pages of the Portland Oregonian, 1895-1899 
The ironies evident in any comparison of the Cuban and Philippine conflicts that 
border the Spanish-American war are troubling. The Spanish-American conflict began 
with U.S. protests over the brutal colonial war Spain was waging against the Cuban 
nationalists. Less than a year later (and only one day after the ratification of the 
Spanish-American Peace treaty), the United States began a brutal colonial war against 
Philippine nationalists. This chapter explores how one metropolitan daily dealt with 
these ironies, and describes the shifts in readers' likely perceptions of America's 
identity among nations. 
The Oregonian created a vision of the Cuban Rebellion that promoted close 
identification between the Cuban cause and the American political ideology. As part 
of a national phenomenon, this sort of reporting may have helped to spur American 
intervention in the Spanish-Cuban conflict. The Philippine insurrection against Spain, 
however, was not given as much attention, nor did the Oregonian promote the same 
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level of identification with the Filipino cause. As America neared its settlement with 
Spain, and as American designs on the islands solidified, tension between U.S. and 
Filipino armies mounted, and the Oregonian's attitude toward the Filipinos became 
hostile. 
Perhaps more interesting than the changes in the Oregonian's perspective on 
nationalist movements is the evolution of the paper's perspective on the identity of 
America relative to other nations. In the few years between the Cuban uprising against 
Spain and the Filipino uprising against the United States, the Oregonian shifted from 
defining American virtue in contrast to European imperialism to defining America as 
the virtuous inheritor of Britain's colonial mission. 
The Cuban Rebels 
The attention of American readers was riveted upon the Cuban revolt long before the 
press took a serious interest in the Philippines. Though the U.S. did not enter the war 
until the spring of 1898, the Oregonian began reporting on the Cuban-Spanish 
conflict, soon after it began in 1895. By December, as the Cuban insurgents first 
approached Havana, they were receiving very favorable coverage. Articles and 
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editorials lent credibility to the insurgent army and to the Cuban Junta's functionaries 
in New York who spoke for the inchoate state. The rebels were presented as tireless 
patriots, and their Spanish rulers as oppressive, corrupt, and weak. In many newspaper 
reports of their military campaigns, a presumption of eventual Cuban victory is clear. 
Cuban rebels identified their movement with the American War of 
Independence, and it appears that their publicists were anxious to promote this idea in 
the minds of American readers. 12 In the Oregonian, the comparison was often 
repeated. Spain's claim that the rebels were merely opportunists was quickly 
dismissed. On December 26, 1895, the Oregonian printed an account of a Christmas 
day meeting of the Cuban Junta that included the following quotation from Tomas 
Estrada Palma, the provisional government's foreign minister: 
Spain is trying to negotiate another war loan of 150,000,000 pesetas, 
and all to crush what she asks the world to believe is a handful of 
bandits. Spain has sent to Cuba since February 24 nearly as many 
troops as England did in the entire revolution of the American 
colonies. 13 
The image that Palma promoted, of Cuban patriots fighting an American-style war of 
independence, was already being echoed by American journalists before this 
Christmas address. The following passage, from an article in the Oregonian on the 
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same day, contains an even stronger allusion to the common bond between Cuban and 
American Patriots: 
The poorly fed, half-grown lads, shipped from Spain, are suffering 
terribly from the effects of climate and the unusual exposure .... The 
Cubans, on the other hand, are animated by a spirit of patriotism, with 
the all-absorbing desire for Freedom; with the fire which drove the 
British before the American patriots under the leadership of 
Washington. 14 
These rebels appeared as the modem analogues of American revolutionaries: 
ambitious, sincere, strong, and driven by high ideals; the Spanish cause, in contrast, 
appeared hopeless. 
Both articles and editorials confidently described the Cuban force as an army, 
and its leaders as generals. Writers presented the insurgents as agents of the popular 
will. Given these perspectives, it is not surprising that editorials called for recognition 
of Cuban belligerency, and even for official recognition of a revolutionary Cuban 
state. One editorialist was so confident of Cuban legitimacy and success that he 
warned, "It is possible that events may move so rapidly that the question of 
recognition of the independence of Cuba may present itself while we are discussing 
whether we shall grant belligerent rights." 15 This represents a rather optimistic view of 
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Cuban military prospects at the time, but, as we shall see, this confidence in Cuban 
success was common.16 
Oregonian articles reflected an opinion, not only of the justice of the Cuban 
cause, but also of the physical and intellectual superiority of the Cuban Army over the 
Spanish one. The Christmas Day headline proclaims, "Christmas in Havana: Cuban 
Insurgents May Celebrate the Day in the Capital. Campos Has Been Out Generaled."17 
Reporting from Cuba was intermittent and not completely reliable at the time. The 
newspaper's judgments about conflicting reports show its presumption that the Cubans 
would prevail. In reference to the same offensive toward Havana, another front-page 
article discounted conflicting reports that Campos had defeated Gomez's army, 
claiming that the story "was either unfounded or that the force he had met with was 
merely a wing of the insurgent army."18 
The Philippines during the War with Spain 
One would expect readers of the Oregonian to take an interest in the Philippines once 
it became clear that Oregon Volunteers might serve there. 19 Though there was some 
McEnroe 20 
interest in the Philippine insurgents, much less was known about them than about their 
Cuban counterparts. The newspaper showed the same contempt for Spanish colonizers 
in the both countries, but the Philippine independence movement was not permitted to 
assume the same mantle of heroism granted the Cuban the Cuban insurgency. In the 
days following Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet at Manila, there was some 
initial enthusiasm for the Filipino's aspirations, but as those aspirations ran afoul of 
America's, the Oregonian shifted from lauding to condemning the rebel's ambitions. 
Whereas discussions of American expansion were largely absent from the dialogue on 
the Cuban war, talk of new Pacific acquisitions accompanied the first news of war in 
the Philippines. Especially after the armistice with Spain, and while the final 
settlement in the Philippines was under discussion, the Oregonian' s treatment of the 
Aguinaldo government became more deprecatory. In the days surrounding the 
ratification of the Spanish-American peace treaty and the outbreak of the U.S.-Filipino 
conflict at Manila, the Oregonian's attitude toward the Filipinos and their 
independence movement was harsh. 
In the same week that headlines announced Dewey's naval victory, the 
Oregonian carried a few articles on the native Filipinos. One short piece reported that 
"half-breeds at Manila arsenal, who are rebels at heart, cut the cables connecting with 
McEnroe 21 
submarine mines," and thus aided the American attack. 20 Another article, which 
received a small title on the fourth page, reported that when Dewey's fleet left China, 
"on one of its ships was an insurgent chief who is to lead the Philippine insurgent 
forces."21 The language in both reports is telling. For citizens of Oregon in the late 
1890s, the words "half-breed" and "chief' would have been closely associated with 
the history of conflict with the Indians of the Northwest. It is noteworthy that the 
Cuban military commanders were, from the beginning of the war, referred to as 
generals, not "chiefs." One of the images of Filipinos communicated to Oregonian 
readers was that of primitive Indians who, though presently friendly to our cause, were 
not credible as a civilized nation. 
Alongside this image, readers were presented a more promising conception of 
the Filipinos as worthy understudies of American civilization. On the same page as an 
article describing Spanish war atrocities against the Philippine natives of Cebu, was a 
piece with this flattering depiction of the rebels: 
The policy of General Aguinaldo, a leader of the Philippines 
Insurgents, after the islands have been captured, embraces the 
independence of the islands, external affairs to be controlled under 
American and European Advisors. Temporarily, at least, the insurgents 
desire an American protectorate on the same lines as that proposed for 
Cuba. The scheme includes free trade to the world ... free press and 
public utterances, religious toleration.22 
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At the beginning of American involvement in the Philippines, readers were presented 
with these two alternative visions of the insurrection. However, it was the image of 
Filipinos as uncivilized that would eventually predominate, as it was best suited to 
America's psychological imperatives as the nation's role in the Philippines changed. 
Discussions of America's commercial and territorial ambitions in the Pacific 
were common in the Oregonian during the war. Expansionist and anti-expansionist 
opinions were commonly aired in the paper during the summer of 1898 as the United 
States struggled against Spain. However, after the Spanish were defeated, and as the 
ratification of the peace and annexation treaty approached, all anti-imperialist voices 
disappeared from the Oregonian. The paper took a clear position in favor of 
annexation, and presented a vision of the Filipinos that complemented this position. 
When America had just begun its military operations in Luzon, the dialogue 
over U.S. expansion was active. On May 3 1898, before troops had landed in the 
Philippines, an article opined that Dewey's victory would probably lead to America 
gaining a port and coaling station in the peace settlement.23 A day later, an expansion-
minded reader wrote "how handy" it would be in this war for the United States to have 
annexed Hawaii already. But an editorial on the same page warned against rising 
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imperialistic impulses: "Already we are in one of the gravest perils of war-the 
clamor for territorial aggrandizement. ... we have no further rightful use of the 
Philippines than as a base of present operations and a hostage pending final 
settlement."24 Much like American statesmen at this phase in the war, Oregonians 
were thinking about naval bases and ports in the Philippines, not about colonial rule. 
The public dialogue addressed a broad range of options, most of which had previously 
had a hypothetical character.25 
By January of 1899 conditions abroad had changed, and so had the editorial 
position of the Oregonian. The clamor for American rule in the Philippines was 
continuous, and the opinions of anti-imperialists were either scorned as foolish or 
condemned as traitorous. Economic arguments for expansion seem to have captured a 
popular audience, as witnessed by an editorial entitled ''The Prize is Ours: Our Asiatic 
Possessions Mean Wealth for Pacific Coast States." It claimed that the "The struggle 
for the commercial supremacy of the world is to be waged in Eastern Asia .... it is 
obvious that under the present condition of productive activity here, an export valve is 
becoming more and more a necessity of industrial existence."26 A few days later, the 
editorial page carried a quotation from Ernst Renan proclaiming the value of colonies 
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as a dumping ground for the poor: "A nation that does not colonize is doomed to 
socialism-to the war of rich and poor."27 
In the second week of February, fighting between U.S. and Filipino troops 
broke out just as the Senate was nearing its final vote on the peace treaty that would 
secure Spain's cession of the islands to America. The conjunction of the two events 
silenced all voices of moderation, and the Oregonian spoke with one clear voice in 
condemning the insurgents and advocating annexation. The front page of the 
Oregonian included an inaccurate report of the outbreak of hostilities, pinning all 
blame on Filipino aggression.28 The paper can hardly be blamed for this, as it was 
simply following the disingenuous account transmitted by General Elwell Otis.29 It is 
interesting, however, that this event so completely galvanized the paper's support for 
annexation. Anti-imperialists, previously given some measure of respect, were now 
vilified. Attacks on senators who had opposed annexation did not stop short of holding 
them personally responsible for the attack on U.S. troops. One particularly biting 
editorial was run with the title, "Our Boys Pay with Blood for Cheap Twaddle";30 
another suggested that the anti-imperialist senators "Hoar and Gorman should be 
expelled as traitors."31 This editorial assault on the anti-imperialist leaders continued 
the following day with a rambling attack on the signatories of an anti-annexation 
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petition. Its backers were derided as foreign agitators, sentimentalists, and effete 
intellectuals. Hoar's statements before the Senate were dismissed as "the same kind of 
platitudinous political philosophy ... characteristic of the Phi Beta Kappa orations at 
Harvard."32 
In late January and Early February, not a voice was raised on behalf of the 
Philippine rebels. And yet, the writing in the Oregonian reveals a nagging awareness 
of the charge of hypocrisy that might well be leveled against the United States. If the 
Cubans, in fighting for their independence from Spain, were accepted as the modem 
successors of the American revolutionaries, how could the Filipinos be condemned for 
fighting first to free themselves from Spanish rule, and then to free themselves from 
American colonization? Americans had long been fond of celebrating the ideology of 
self-determination that justified the nation's revolutionary genesis. In descriptions of 
foreign policy, Americans liked to claim the moral high ground in contrast to the 
corrupt colonial powers of Europe. The conclusion that the United States had 
abandoned its principles by seeking to conquer the Philippines was so obvious that 
even the most rabidly imperialistic editorials were compelled to respond to the 
anticipated charge. 
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In washing America's hands of the charge of conquest, it was necessary to 
view the U.S. government as the legitimate government of the Philippine people, and 
to view the rebels not as national patriots of the Philippines, but as national traitors to 
the United States.33 The Oregonian covered the Senate debates, quoting expansionist 
senators whose arguments described the paradigm within which the war would be 
understood by readers of the Oregonian. These hawkish senators relied on the notion 
that America's claims in the Philippines derived from "the right of conquest under the 
laws of war."34 This, of course, followed the logic of the treaty itself. The settlement 
assumed that the people of the Philippines could be transferred from the authority of 
Spain to the authority of the United States by consent of the two parties. Implicit in 
this argument was the notion that Spain was the legitimate ruler of the Philippines 
regardless of the will of the Filipinos. A quotation from Senator Lodge, carried by the 
Oregonian, demonstrated the logic of this perspective: "Those people who have 
attacked the United States' force are in the eye of international law still subjects of 
Spain."35 The Lodge argument held that prior to the date on which the Spanish-
American treaty went into effect, the Filipinos were Spanish subjects; after that date 
they became American subjects-though clearly not American citizens. The same 
article related that "it was said at the State Department, plainly, that Agoncillo [the 
McEnroe 27 
foreign minister of the insurgent government] was either a traitor or a spy. If the 
Philippines are regarded as American territory, then he is a representative and active 
agent of an insurrection against he United States, and as such a traitor."36 
Though not all of the arguments of the imperialist senators and State 
Department officials agreed in their particulars, all boldly rejected the idea that 
Filipinos were entitled to determine their own government. Editorials in the 
Oregonian follow suit. One begins with the patriotic line, "The flag of the United 
States will never be retired from the Philippines."37 It then goes on to script Aguinaldo 
as a traitor to the United States: "Aguinaldo is entitled to no consideration. He 
deserves punishment as an ingrate, if not a traitor, for he has taken up arms against his 
benefactor." The author was responding to the possible objection that "Aguinaldo had 
virtually won their independence from Spain before our fleet appeared in Manila bay," 
and that the United States had intervened to crush a war of national liberation. He was 
correct in dismissing this inflated view of the insurgency's prior success, but the logic 
behind his indictment of Aguinaldo was bizarre. He held him guilty of treason against 
the United States because he was fighting against U.S. rule, but also criticized him for 
not fighting hard enough against Spanish rule: "Aguinaldo himself, a Benedict Arnold 
to his own countrymen, had sold out to the Spanish Authorities." Together, these 
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statements add up to a claim that Filipinos should be considered traitors for fighting 
against the United States or for failing to fight against Spanish rule, but not for 
supporting U.S. colonization. 
The Filipinos' June 28 Declaration of Independence, modeled on that of the 
United States, put Americans in a difficult position.38 It would seem necessary for the 
United States to either renounce the logic of its own Declaration of Independence or 
give up its colonial ambitions in the Philippines. An editorial syndicated from the New 
York Times attempted to escape this dilemma by arguing that that the racial and 
cultural inferiority of the Filipinos placed them outside the logic of the Declaration of 
Independence.39 It asked, "What does the language of the Declaration Independence 
about 'deriving their just power from the consent of the governed' mean when applied 
to the Filipinos?" It went on to ridicule the idea of honoring a plebiscite for 
independence passed by such a barbaric populace: "In a week the lives and property of 
foreign residents would be in danger. In a month the islands would be given up to 
bloody strife." Using a derogatory vocabulary normally reserved for American blacks, 
the editorialist suggested that the racial-cultural identity of the Filipino revolutionaries 
made them inherently different from the American founding fathers: "George 
Washington did not carry a gold whistle as a symbol of his authority. Sam Adams and 
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Patrick Henry were not prancing blackamors. The American Revolution was not a 
'cake walk."' The sentiment of the New York Times editorialist was echoed by another 
syndicated piece from the St. Louis Globe-Democrat which pointed out that Thomas 
Jefferson was a slave owner and argued that the principles of the Declaration of 
Independence were never intended to be universal. In his opinion, government by 
consent should only be the standard among those capable of self-government, i.e., 
European peoples.40 
Portland writers were quick to contribute to explanations of why the logic of 
the American Revolution could not be applied to the Philippines. One lengthy editorial 
entitled "Consent of the Governed: A Waste of Time to Pay attention to that Theory," 
launched venomous assaults on Senator Bacon's proposed amendment to the peace 
treaty that would have permitted Philippine self-determination. The author pointed out 
that in its territorial expansion, the United States had never paid attention to this 
principle, and that for fools like Senator Bacon, "it would be a waste of time to repeat 
that the consent of the governed does not mean historically the consent of the 
governed."41 Aguinaldo was dismissed as "simply an adventurer ... [who] returned 
thither [to the Philippines] by means of the United States, and is trying to set up a 
government for his own benefit." 
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Several editorials appearing in the Oregonian angrily denied the parallels 
between the American Revolution and the Philippine Rebellion without offering any 
arguments in support of this position, as though the claim would stand ipso facto. One 
piece claimed that the principle of "no taxation without representation" did not apply 
to the Philippines and warned that the idea of annexation obliging the U.S. to admit 
Filipino representatives was "a baseless fabrication."42 The author insisted that the 
principle of non-entanglement contained in Washington's Farewell Address had 
nothing to do with America's new colonial enterprises. 
Aguinaldo himself presented some difficulties for writers advocating the cause 
of annexation. His status as a former ally, transported to the Philippines by the United 
States, gave some cause for discomfort. For those favorably disposed toward the Latin 
American or Greek independence movements of the 1820s, not to mention the Cuban 
revolt, Aguinaldo might well have seemed an appealing figure. The fact that writers so 
often insisted that he was not another George Washington shows that they feared he 
could be viewed in that light. Some insisted that an Asian could never be a George 
Washington, but feared that misguided American leaders were presenting him as such. 
One writer alleged that, "Senators of the United States have proclaimed him 
[Aguinaldo] a new George Washington risen upon the world, and have invited and 
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urged him to resist the United States."43 In fact, U.S. Senators were not making such 
proclamations, but this did not prevent tremendous hostility toward the Senators who 
were suspected of harboring thoughts of political equality with Filipinos.44 
Massachusetts Senator George Frisbie Hoar, elder statesman of the anti-imperialist 
movement, was a favorite target for hawkish expansionists. An editorial attacking 
Senator Hoar's attempt to avert annexation fumed, "And if he then insists that the 
Filipinos are at present capable of maintaining a real government, we shall be obliged 
to warn him that he might as well stop talking."45 
America in the Image of Britain 
As Americans struggled to justify the nation's conduct in the Philippines, they could 
not help but compare themselves to Great Britain. In the years before the Spanish-
American war, the U.S. gloried in the distinctions between its enlightened foreign 
policy and Britain's self-serving one. But as America's expansionist foreign policy 
came to resemble England's, American writers began to embrace the colonial ideology 
of the mother county. 
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In 1895, while readers of the Oregonian were captivated by the struggle 
between Spain and Cuba, their attention was also fixed nervously on the tension 
between the United States and England over Venezuela. Some articles welcomed the 
approach of war with England, and others dreaded it. More significant, though, was 
the manner in which the conflict between the United States and Britain gave voice to 
writers' notions about the fundamental identities of the two nations. Newspaper stories 
reminded readers of America's special role as the defender of free nations against 
grasping empires. In December of 1895 one piece proclaimed, "England cannot fight 
upon this issue .... the Monroe Doctrine has been put bravely to a nation of the first 
rank."46 Another asserted that "The principle of American independence of 
monarchical aggression is one which will be maintained as long as the United States 
exists."47 America was represented as a spokesman for self-determination and for the 
separation of Eastern and Western hemispheres. It was a self-image consonant with 
the United States' own origins as a schismatic group of colonies that severed its ties 
with an Old World empire. 
In 1898 and early 1899, as America warmed to the idea of Pacific colonies, an 
editorial in the Oregonian made an interesting case for controlling the Philippines. The 
piece skillfully resolved one of the embarrassing elements of U.S. claims in the 
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Philippines. The dilemma was this: If colonial rule was not considered legitimate, 
America's liberation of Cuba and the Philippines would be justified, but its retention 
of them as colonies would not be; if colonial rule was acceptable, then annexation of 
the Philippines would be just, but America's original causus belli vis Spain would be 
suspect. Breaking with American tradition, the editorialist takes the position that 
colonial rule was not inherently good or bad. America was quite justified in seizing the 
Philippines provided it would govern them better than Spain. The author considered 
that England's seizure of Dutch colonies in India brought the inhabitants stability and 
superior governance: "There does not seem to be any good reason for believing that 
the United States, following the same line of policy adopted by England in her 
administration, cannot achieve satisfactory results."48 
Editorials in the Oregonian suggested that America emulate English rule 
while learning from Britain's past errors. One writer suggested that America employ 
the British method of conserving resources by ruling through local authorities.49 
Another writer hoped that the United States would learn from the British experience in 
the Sepoy Mutiny and avoid provoking religious conflict by reining in missionaries.50 
Most of the articles in this vein imply that America had somehow come of age and 
should now join in the colonial work of the mother country: 
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[the Philippines] were drawn to the United States by a course of events 
not designed by ourselves. Territorial acquisition was not our object. .. 
. we found ourselves at war with Spain, drawn to it by moral 
obligations we could not ignore .... Our country became responsible to 
the world for the preservation of order and protection of industry and 
commerce of the islands .... we shall find, in all probability, no 
material profit to ourselves ... but we cannot refuse.51 
With remarkable speed, Americans seem not only to have stopped condemning 
colonialism, but also to have embraced it as a moral good and a responsibility that 
they now shared with England. 
The Oregonian repeated inspirational messages from Britain that lauded 
America's new mission and emphasized the two nations' shared racial destiny. One 
piece, reprinted from London's Spectator, celebrated that "The dominant fact of the 
year 1898 has been the rise in the position of the English-speaking peoples."52 The 
author expressed the wish that "the two branches of the English-speaking race, both of 
them victorious, would join together," while warning that America "must consider the 
work of governing a strenuous and painful occupation." In an enthusiastic display of 
Anglophone fraternity, the Oregonian printed Rudyard Kipling's "White Man's 
Burden," followed the next day by a letter praising its artistry and the beauty of its 
sentiments. 53 
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Clearly, during the five years from the beginning of Spain's colonial war in 
Cuba to the beginning of America's colonial war in the Philippines, Portlanders came 
to understand their national identity differently. The Oregonian never lost its 
conviction about America's moral virtue among nations, but it came to define that 
virtue in a very different way. The young American republic that had once led the 
world by example alone, was now transformed into a great power that would lead the 
world by military might and colonial tutelage. 
Kipling the Prophet 
In the spring of 1899, the Oregonian drew inspiration for national expansion from a 
variety of political, scientific, literary, and religious sources. No individual so 
completely represented this sense of global mission its writers as Rudyard Kipling. In 
the first two months of the Philippine War, the Oregonian printed eleven pieces on 
Kipling. His imperialistic themes spoke both to an American sense of racial destiny 
and to the growing obsession with America's emulation of the British Empire. His 
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journalistic admirers invested him with tremendous moral authority, and esteemed his 
writing above virtua11y aJI else in the English language. 
The same day that the paper announced the outbreak of War at Manila, it 
printed "The White Man's Burden" as an inspiration to its readers.54 A day later, an 
editorialist gushed over Kipling's genius.55 The following day, an adoring front-page 
portrait of Kipling was accompanied by the headline "Kipling May Be Elevated to the 
Peerage."56 Oregonian writers venerated not just his work but the man himself. 
Anxious articles, keeping readers abreast of Kipling's health and the welfare of his 
children, appeared on the front page57 Kipling was considered equally edifying to 
young and old. The "Youth" section of a Sunday paper in March included a lengthy 
excerpt from one of his children's stories.58 Further tribute was paid to Kipling's 
salutary effect on young minds in a reader's letter to the editor. The letter lashed out in 
anger at the new public library for offering a book on history that did not adequately 
express American greatness. Providing some guidance to the library on the proper 
canon, the irate reader listed nineteen authors that he considered indispensable. Both 
Kipling and Alfred Thayer Mahan were included.59 
In reading the Oregonian's treatment of Kipling, one has the sense that the 
paper and its readers subscribed to a narrow view of poetry and literature. Its esteem 
McEnroe 37 
for Kipling was less a product of literary sensibilities than of a desire for an 
intellectual standard-bearer for Anglo-American imperialism. A later editorial 
proclaimed: "In the name of humanity, Rudyard Kipling is indeed the poet of the hour . 
. . . He has no peer." Yet, the editorialist soon revealed that his esteem for Kipling had 
little to do with the quality of the verse. For him, Kipling represented the greatness of 
English rule and the promise of American colonial rule. He concluded his remarks 
thus: "England has spent a century and [a] hecatomb of lives of its own sons and of the 
Eastern natives to whom it has given protection, and America stands at the threshold 
of a future big with fortunes, and the honor of our own people and of the lands and 
peoples wrenched from Spain."60 Yet even this writer's rhapsodic admiration for 
Kipling was exceeded by the sermon of a local clergyman printed on the next page. 
Under the headline 'Kipling's Wonder Words," the sermon of a local Unitarian 
minister proclaimed, "Again Kipling has risen to the heights of prophetic vision" in 
works like "the 'Recessional' and 'the White Man's Burden."' In a sweeping 
panegyric, the speaker claimed that Kipling was the standard-bearer of the generation, 
for Christianity, for the race, and for modem poetry.61 
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The Philippines as the New Frontier 
Oregonian articles often conveyed an impression of the present war as a crucial 
chapter in greater process of historical development. The underlying metanarrative 
was one in which a people, variously identified as "Aryan," "Anglo-Saxon," or 
"White," were understood to be agents for the transformation of the world through the 
conquest of the uncivilized.62 Sometimes the process was envisioned as spanning from 
time immemorial to the distant future. However, in connecting the Philippine war to 
more recent historical experience, Oregonian writers described the annexation of the 
Philippines as a continuation of the conquest and settlement of the American West.63 
A July article reprinted from the Nashville American described the Philippine 
war as the next step in a process of westward expansion begun a hundred years before: 
"The outward movement which started with the Louisiana Purchase was succeeded by 
the purchase of Florida, the trade with Mexico and the Oregon compromise, extending 
the domain of these United States." The writer considered this sequence of events, as 
not so much a calculated policy but a natural process that "cannot be checked."64 A 
March editorial communicated the same historical vision, describing the United 
States' inevitable absorption of all of the Americas, and continued westward march 
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across the Pacific. The author advocated the future annexation of the "Anglo-Saxon 
country of Canada," and even considered the conquest of less desirable "Spanish-
American" countries a logical measure. Though many these dreams were still distant, 
he rejoiced that "In one direction the manifest destiny idea of the '40s has been 
surpassed by the actuality of 50 years later, for it did not include the Philippines."65 
Observers had begun to think of the Philippines not only as a frontier of 
Anglo-Saxon civilization, but, in more concrete terms, as the continuation of 
America's western frontier. In March of 1899, the Oregonian printed a letter from 
Army Paymaster Major Theodore Sternberg to a War Department officer. The 
headline read, "To Build an Empire/ Many Soldiers Willing to Settle in the 
Philippines/ Favorable Start for Colonies." In the letter, Sternberg claimed that at least 
ten percent of the U.S. soldiers would settle in the Philippines. He pointed to the 
islands' rich resources and joined the chorus of other annexationists in rejecting the 
claim that "White men cannot work in the tropics." To Sternberg, there was no 
significant difference between the old frontier and the new one. He advised that, "The 
only way to Americanize these islands is [by following] the example of American 
pioneers engaged in making a home for themselves."66 A few pages after Sternberg's 
letter, an enthusiastic Oregonian article reported that a farsighted group of Oregon 
l 
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Volunteers "want to stay and mine" and had formed "a committee to develop the 
mineral resources of the Philippines. 67 
The Oregonian presented the idea that the annexation of the Philippines would 
re-enact the settlement of Oregon itself. The industrious Americans were simply 
taking another step to the west. They would fend off claims to the desired territory 
from other European powers, subdue the indigenous inhabitants, and begin 
prospecting for minerals and harnessing the region's agricultural wealth. Eventually, 
they would remake a new land in the image of their own. It should come as no 
surprise, then, that Oregonians so often viewed the Filipinos neither as foreign 
nationals nor as potential American citizens. Like the Klamaths, Modocs, or Nez 
Pierce, the Tagalogs and other Filipino ethnic groups were seen as Indians who 
inhabited the land, but had no ultimate claim to it. 
Filipinos as Indians 
At the turn of the century, Indian wars were still a part of recent memory for 
Oregonians and other westerners. The Modoc and Nez Pierce wars were only two 
decades past, and the White citizens of Oregon were keenly aware that their state was 
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a land wrested from the Indians. In fact, Americans in the West still viewed the small 
populations of the Indian reservations as barbaric. 
In the summer of 1899 an article reprinted from Pendleton's East Oregonian 
described the goings on at a nearby Indian camp as follows: "Out at the Indian 
encampment last evening, visitors were treated to an exhibition of some of the weird 
characteristics of the aboriginal tribes."68 The people of Pendleton lived right beside 
the Umatilla Indian reservation, but the cultural boundary was a significant one. They 
did not view the Indians as Americans, yet they considered the land beneath them to 
be American soil. These aboriginal peoples were exotic, inferior, and unconnected to 
the politics of the nation or the relations between nations. 
It is significant that Americans described the Philippine War as an 
"insurrection," because this is exactly how they had described conflicts with the North 
American Indian tribes. The collection of articles in the March 14 and 15 issues of the 
Oregonian illustrate the connection between these ideas in the minds of American 
observers. Two pieces on the same page sum up this view. One attacked the voices of 
"theorists and doctrinaires" who believed that Filipinos could be negotiated with or 
permitted to govern themselves. The author suggested an approach that mirrored the 







We are in for the job and cannot back out. ... when their submission is received, these 
children of the tropic will be dealt with kindly and justly ."69 An article beside it 
announced the beginning of a new campaign in Luzon. It opined that the experience of 
the commanding officers was well suited to the task, pointing to General Otis' 
experience in the Indian campaigns of 1876 and noting that his command was filled 
with "such trained and experienced offices, all graduates of the Civil War and Indian 
campaigns."70 The next day's paper pointed out how contemporary the idea of Indian 
war was in 1899. A report from the Southwest warned that "the Indians are becoming 
restless, and it is said that they threaten all manner of things .... an outbreak may 
occur at any time."71 On the same page, a report from Minnesota claimed that the 
"Leech Jake Indians are in a dirty temper and ready to start any sort of deviltry," 
estimating that the tribe could raise 1,200 armed troops.72 
For Oregonian readers, Indians, and those abroad who appeared like Indians, 
did not belong to a civilized community, and were thus not protected by the political 
ideology or the military conventions that applied to American citizens or the citizens 
of foreign nations.73 A front-page headline in March pronounced the Filipinos "Worse 
Than Indians." The article described an incident in which American troops were fired 
upon while attempting to parley with enemy soldiers who had raised a white flag.74 
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Stories like this one confirmed the belief that the war against the Filipinos should be 
carried out with a brutality previously reserved for the suppression of Indian uprisings. 
A July article presented an interview with a returning American soldier who praised 
the new groups of U.S. Scouts that fought the "Filipinos Filipino fashion."75 In 
describing their tactics, the author explained that the new scouts "sneak up Indian 
fashion" to kill the enemy. Oregonian editorials embraced the wholesale application 
of America's past military and political approach to Indians to its treatment of 
Filipinos. Several editorials defined the political status of the Philippines by analogy to 
previous western territories, and understood the position of Filipinos according to the 
same metaphor: "When the ratification of the treaty is formally completed, the 
president will have the same obligation to stamp out the insurrection of Aguinaldo 
with the armed heel of war that we would have in any other American territory for 
which no definitive form of government has been provided by Congress." He suggests 
that the U.S should follow the precedent of taking the sons of "Native Chiefs" to 
Washington "in order to educate them by object lessons to [have] respect for and 
dread of the 'Great White Father. "'76 
\ 
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Theories of Racial Domination and Genocide 
Although analyses of U.S. policy in the Philippines touched on issues of economics 
and politics, the Oregonian most often discussed the Philippine War and the future of 
the colony in terms of race. The same issues reappeared day after day in the paper: the 
capabilities and defects of the Filipino race, the destiny of the Anglos Saxon race, and 
the effects of the tropics on northern races.77 Each week, Oregonian writers and 
editorialists offered the same answers to the same questions. All voices seemed to 
agree on the following points: American Anglo-Saxons had a racial destiny and duty 
to rule the Philippines; the Philippine race was incapable of governing itself; and 
despite obsolete claims to the contrary, Americans, like the English, could rule in any 
climate and in any part of the world. 
There were some differences of opinion as to the exact course of action 
dictated by this Anglo-Saxon racial mission. Most believed the Filipinos 
constitutionally incapable of political life, but some foresaw a slow process of cultural 
uplift under the competent guidance of American rulers. In the conduct of the war, 
most writers advocated the application of brutal methods, arguing that one could not 
succeed in using civilized methods against barbarians. It seemed possible that a stem 
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and uncompromising process of pacification might lay the foundation for peaceful 
American rule; thus cruel methods were deemed necessary and ultimately beneficial to 
the inhabitants, who would soon live in a peaceful and ordered land. Yet, in a 
significant number of articles, a more troubling vision of America's racial mission 
appeared- one in which the brutalities of war were viewed not just as regrettable 
means, but as part of a desired end. These articles described the war as the 
extermination of an obstinate and inferior people whose interests should not stand in 
the way of America's. 
For some, the racial mission of the United States was also a spiritual calling. 
Elsewhere in the United States, missionary societies were active in promoting the 
evangelization of the Philippines. President McKinley even described his decision to 
seek annexation of the Philippines as something of a spiritual conversion, guided by 
prayer, and he saw America's mission, in part, as a Protestant mission. Yet Oregon 
seems to have had a less evangelical character than much of the country.78 The 
Oregonian gave little attention to the prospects of proselytizing in the Philippines, but 
it did present the idea of the United States as a nation with a divine sanction for 
greatness. 
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On the freethinking edge of Portland's religious spectrum, the Unitarians 
turned to Kipling as a prophet of America's mission among nations.79 Congregational 
Minister Arthur Ackerman's sermons, also published in the Oregonian, revealed an 
even stronger sense of divine mandate for American conquest. The Oregonian 
published two of Reverend Ackerman's sermons, the first of which was topped by the 
headline "Scripture of Expansion." Both sermons repeated the image of America as a 
youthful nation destined to replace an older order. In one sermon, Ackerman described 
the decadent civilizations of Asia as ripe for transformation at the hands of 
"72,000,000 wide awake Anglo-Saxon Americans."80 In the next week's sermon, he 
presented classical and biblical lessons on the tragic consequences faced by nations 
that lack the will to sustain their aggressive spirit. He lamented that Hektor lingered on 
the walls with Adromache rather than plunging manfully into battle, and he attributed 
the fall of the Davidic kingdom to the "failure of expansion under Solomon." His 
historical lesson ended by challenging his listeners to embrace imperialism: "Coming 
now to the close of this series with the nation we love on the verge of a new 
expansion, towering in the full strength of Solomonic splendor, what shall we say."81 
To understand Oregonians' tum of the century discussion of race and 
expansion, a modem reader must abandon any expectation that the people of the 1890s 
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viewed race, racial characteristics, or racial competition with distrust or moral 
ambivalence. At the time, the very idea of race was inextricable wedded to a 
Darwinian concept of competition and to notions of national exceptionalism and 
destiny. In the pages of the Oregonian during these years, the history of the world was 
the history of racial competition. A July editorial devoted to minute discussions of the 
proper nomenclature of English-speaking races began by laying out a premise 
common to writers of the day: "The instinct of national assertion that manifests itself 
in racial prejudice is sound and wholesome."82 The author insisted that people should 
rally to their own. A close examination of this editorial reveals some of the 
historiographic challenges of interpreting commentary on race in sources from the 
1890s. Whereas the phrase "racial prejudice" has been a charge of moral failure since 
the mid-twentieth century, it described a laudable instinct to the Oregonians of 1899. 
A sense of racial hierarchy underlies virtually every Oregonian piece on 
Philippine policy.83 Most articles joined the idea of American frontier settlement to the 
alluring model of British imperialism. The prevailing notion of "Indian warfare" as 
acceptable against "savages" was bolstered by the conviction that cruelty in the 
current war would be the foundation of a kinder paternalism in the future. However, 
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beginning in March of 1899, as Oregon soldiers launched their first campaigns in the 
field, a new perspective appeared in the Oregonian, one that called for genocide. 
The Oregonian's war reporting came from official sources, other news 
organizations, the letters of Oregon soldiers, and the writing of its special 
correspondents. Two men, Fielding Lewis Poindexter and W.D.B. Dodson, were both 
foot soldiers and correspondents employed by the Oregonian. Their articles show the 
intersection of the experiences of the Oregon Volunteers and the editorial perspective 
of the paper. 
A week after the Oregon Volunteers' first field campaign began, a front-page 
headline proclaimed, "All Rebels at Heart/ Extermination of the Tagolo[g]s the Only 
Guarantee of peace." The article had a practical tone. It suggested that the entire 
population might be plotting the murder of all Whites, and warned that "the Oriental 
character is so deceptive" that these homicidal threats were hard to perceive. The 
article explained that the "English and other residents" believed all members of the 
Tagalog tribe were committed to rebellion, and implied that the war must therefore be 
fought not just against the enemy soldiers, but against the entire ethnic population. 
Moreover, the author believed that the army was on the right track by having insured 
that "Every hut between the city [Manila] and the American lines is a heap of ashes."84 
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The soldiers' visceral sense of race war found expression in many articles. One 
entitled "How War Is Conducted in the Philippines," described soldiers' experiences 
at the outbreak of the war: "Taunted with cowardice, dared and scorned by blacks, the 
American soldiers had drifted into a mental state that yearned for an opportunity to 
give vent to Anglo-Saxon valor. ... Hatred animated every breast for the conceit of 
the ignorant natives had become so intolerable." The article described the first days of 
the war as governed by a "policy of devastation" and indicated that even when later 
orders forbade plunder and needless destruction, they were issued "with reluctance" 
and not observed by the troops or enforced by the commanders. The correspondent 
described looting with amusement: "It was comical to see how the boys would get 
chickens and young pigs not withstanding" the orders against plunder.85 
Soldiers' letters appeared in the Oregonian in greater numbers beginning in 
March. They employed the same vocabulary to describe the war that is found in 
Oregon soldiers' unpublished correspondence Soldiers spoke of looting as "relic 
hunting" and of combat as a hunt for "niggers." A March letter described fighting 
"niggers," hunting for "relics," and even hunting for "live relics."86 Headlines above 
soldiers' correspondence often contained exclamations such as "Shot them Like 
Coons."87 
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The field reporting of Oregonian correspondent and soldier Fielding Lewis 
Poindexter contained none of the hostility perceptible in the writing of many of his 
peers. It simply recounted the harsh methods by which the U.S. soldiers prosecuted the 
war. Reporting from the March advance toward Laguna de Bay, he enumerated the 
positions captured by the Oregon troops, the casualties, and the destruction of towns 
and villages along the way. The following passage shows the characteristics of the 
campaign: 
during the chase a village [Taguig] of about 300 houses, many of them 
containing insurgent stores, was burned .... [following an ambush against the 
22°d Regulars] it was decided to proceed at once to kill or drive into the lake 
every native possible to be found in the half moon shaped district ... between 
the Mateo river and the end of the lake, a distance of 12 miles .... We had 
been out a week and .... [had] killed or captured 1000 natives and destroyed, 
say, 5,000,000 pesos worth of property." 
Poindexter showed some regret at the consequences of the war, but considered these 
measures to be necessary. 88 
W.D.B. Dodson, whose report appeared in the same paper, seemed less self-
conscious about the extreme methods of the war. Aware that some Americans were 
discussing war atrocities in the Philippines, Dodson protested that instances of medical 
McEnroe 51 
care being provided to enemy captives refuted "charges of ruthlessness." However, the 
rest of the article described a race war with little compassion. Recounting the details of 
an infantry advance, Dodson included the following anecdote: "Colonel Egbert ... 
when the Oregon boys started ... said to the boys 'just watch those d-----d volunteers 
go for the nigger trenches it is the prittiest sight I ever saw.' It was beautiful. ... the 
blacks could not stop that."89 
Manhood and the Cult of Death 
Kristine Hoganson, in Fighting for American Manhood, analyzes the political 
discourse surrounding the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars. Her approach is to 
study the rhetorical forms of American politics in order to describe the psychological 
forces that surrounded policy. She concludes that American men of the era, making 
their careers in the shadow of the Civil War generation, described the war and the 
question of national expansion as a referendum on masculinity. The same themes and 
rhetorical forms that Hoganson identifies in the national discourse appear in the 
Oregonian. 
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Editorial critics of the Anti-imperialist movement referred to their opponents 
not as "antis," but as "Aunties,' stressing lack of proper masculine nationalism. The 
Oregonian was fond of this current in the national debate, delighting in articles from 
around the county that implicated the intelligentsia in an effeminate foreign policy. A 
piece reprinted from the Chicago Inter Ocean heaped abuse on a Professor Von Holst 
who had recently suggested that a treaty between Spain and the U.S. could not confer 
the right to rule the Filipinos without their consent. The Oregonian title reads "A 
Professor's nonsense/ Chief of the 'Aunties and His Silly Talk."90 Two days later, a 
piece from the New York Sun entitled "No Scarcity of Soldiers/ The 'Aunties' 
Powerless To Stop Recruiting for the Army," rejoiced that, despite feeble protestations 
against the war, enlistments continued to prove that the "vigor and aggressiveness of 
youth have not departed the American Race."91 This association between race, 
masculinity, and war was very common in the Oregonian as in these other papers. 
Many of the pieces suggest the same understanding of the historical position of the 
nation: the United States was described as a virile and expansive power that could 
only thrive if engaged in war, and only remain healthy to face external threats if the 
internal menace of feminine pacifism were held in check.92 
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Local editorials had the same characteristics as those syndicated from other 
dailies. One March editorial page carried three pieces attacking critics of the war: two 
railed against New Englanders for seeking negotiation; the third made the familiar 
argument linking war, manhood, and race: ''This is our first actual contact with the 
affairs of the great outer world. Are we going to flunk at the first encounter. We Shall 
not, thanks to the Spirit of our race, and thanks to God for our fighting mood! ... In 
the career of every virile nation there are times when it must fight."93 In pieces like 
this, it became clear that the Portland critics of the Anti-Imperialist League did not 
engage their opponents on the basis of a shared logic. Anti-Imperialists talked about 
American political traditions; their adversaries at the Oregonian spoke of a worldwide 
contest between races and of preserving the culture of war. 94 Intellectual arguments 
were often refuted, not with other intellectual arguments, but with a rejection of 
intellectualism and a celebration of masculine primitivism. One editorial lauded this 
new primitivism as revival of the nation's youthful virility: "The Force that Makes 
History/ Impressive Display of Elemental Instincts in Young American Movement." 
In the Young American Movement, a cousin to European fascism, the writer saw the 
dream of Aryan world-conquest: 
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"The motive of this rush into the army for foreign service is the 
irrepressible spirit of adventure, the blind impulse to effort outward that 
drives every vital people like a possession, and that has a driven people 
for a thousand years from its early seats on Norse and Frisian Shores up 
and down and across ... four continents .... The American youth of 
today are declaring their share in the inheritance of the race."95 
The war, then, became a fulfillment of masculine nature, a symbol of American 
greatness, and part of a centuries-old process of Aryan world conquest. 
Some writers considered war categorically good, rejecting all discussions of 
ethics, and even national interest, as secondary in importance. War was needed to 
strengthen the race for the great struggle between races and civilizations. One such 
editorial celebrated "the combative spirit without which none of the great movements 
of civilization could be carried forward." The author felt it unnecessary to address the 
origins or objectives of the war; he saw the war as a matter of national, masculine 
pride, not of calculation interests: "nearly every company has suffered from the 
treacherous Filipinos, there is a general desire to stay and make the account even." He, 
in fact, praised Americans for seeking to kill or be killed without any understanding of 
the ends: "These men are of the stamp of men who believe that life has a purpose, 
even though they may be unable to divine it."96 
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III. The Observations of Oregon Soldiers, May 1898 to July 1900 
Personal and Political Motives of Oregon Soldiers 
The idealist and patriotic headlines of the 1898 penny press might lead a modem 
observer to conclude that the enormous number of volunteers for the war was a 
product of general enthusiasm for the Cuban cause. Following this logic, one would 
expect soldiers to have been animated by an ideology of national self-determination 
and republicanism, and to have been shocked by the mission of conquest assigned to 
them in the Philippines. However, for the average Oregon volunteer, this was not the 
case. The early writings of Oregon soldiers (before the outbreak of war with the 
Filipinos) reveal little interest in the fate of Cuba and little sympathy for the Philippine 
independence movement. The vast majority of Oregon soldiers enlisted for personal, 
not ideological motives. They were attracted by the hopes of improving their 
economic, professional, and civic standing through military service. They were 
patriots inasmuch as they were committed to the strength and power of the United 
States, but they were not committed to spreading American ideology abroad. 
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The soldiers of the Pacific Northwest were men on the lookout for new 
opportunities. Many were originally mid-westerners who had moved to the West 
Coast in the hopes of bettering their lot in life. Some were manual laborers, and some 
were middle class shop-keeps or clerks, but all saw military experience as a chance to 
save some money for the future, increase their social standing, obtain peacetime 
commissions, or get the first chance at new business opportunities abroad. 
George Newell enlisted with an optimism and naivete that was typical of his 
peers. Newell was a young man from a family of struggling small landowners who 
believed that a short tour of duty would bring him and his family new prospects. When 
Newell enlisted, he wrote to his mother, assuring her that he would be safe and 
pointing out the likely benefits: 
"[the enlistment officer] thought I would rise an[d] get a commishion 
[sic] if I studied while I am in the army an[d] that he would help me 
study .... I don't think I wuld [sic] get hurt. I don't think this regiment 
would leave this Co[a]st at all in case of war. An[d] if by next pay day 
there isn[']t any war I will file on that land. I have a good job now 
an[ d] if there is no war I think I can hold it down untill [sic] I am 
discharged. "97 
His letters from the Philippines are filled with promises to send more money home and 
with schemes to pick up extra income. While stationed in Manila he worked as a 
barber on the side and was ever vigilant for new profit making ventures.98 Just a few 
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weeks after the capture of Manila, Newell remarked that "this is a rich country an[d] if 
the U.S. holds it I am agoing [sic] to try an[d] get in business here."99 
Newell later became something of hero in his regiment, and his commitment to 
his fellow soldiers and his hostility toward the enemy, once engaged in combat, was 
intense, but his writing shows no interest in, or knowledge of, the ideological debates 
surrounding the war. He showed little surprise or interest when the Philippine army 
replaced the Spanish army as his enemy, and he made little attempt to understand the 
events of the first week of February, 1899, when the second war commenced. Of the 
general confusion, he merely remarked that he knew to "put your trust in God and all 
will come out well."100 
A year after most of his peers had returned to the U.S., Newell was still 
looking for new opportunities in the military. In March of 1900 he considered 
reenlisting in hopes of being promoted to sergeant, and in July he reported to his 
family, "Well we are going to China to fight the Boxers, we got the order the day 
before yesterday & will go on board the transport Indinia [sic] tomorrow morning."101 
As he departed the Philippines for China, Newell wrote no reflections on the fate of 
the Filipinos or speculations on the politics of suppressing the Boxer Rebellion. As 
always, his concerns were practical "I will write again from the Chinia [sic]. Well I 
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have just 2 months from today to serve & I will come home, but if I can get a good job 
when I am discharged it may be six months before I get home. Well don't worry about 
me I won't get killed at least I don't think I will."102 
George Telfer had a far more sophisticated understanding of the war, but his 
personal calculations were much like Newell's. In peacetime, Telfer was a salesman 
with an ardent desire to advance his social standing and maintain a respectable middle 
class home. Telfer believed his position as an officer was vital to these ends. He had a 
preoccupation with Rudyard Kipling derived in part, it seems, from a vision of himself 
as a gentleman officer. In categorizing the soldiers, Telfer wrote, "As usual the man 
from a refined home is the most patient of all. The only trouble we have had is with 
the country boys-who never knew good homes. We are believers in Kipling's saying 
the best army is an army of gentlemen."103 Yet, Telfer was aware that his status as a 
gentleman was tenuous at best. Although he sometimes complained about the 
fraternization of officers and enlisted men- "familiarity breeds contempt" -he was 
offended when treated as an inferior by officers of higher rank. 104 Telfer frequently 
calculated his chances of gaining a promotion in the Volunteers or a regular 
appointment. In his letters home, he described the minute intricacies of staffing and 
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promotion, exploring every opportunity to use personal connections to his 
advantage105• 
Telfer devoted just as much thought to other means of advancement as he did 
to military commissions. His letters included advice to his wife on the proper training 
and social contacts for the children, and he provided his own advice on social climbing 
in letters to his son and daughters. He considered the Philippines a promising realm for 
investments and hatched business plans ranging from sugar and coffee cultivation to 
canned goods distribution. 106 Without any money to invest, Telfer was sometimes 
forced to conclude "I don't think I shall relocate to Manila. At least not until I have 
returned to America. I haven't the necessary capital yet."107 Though George Telfer was 
a Lieutenant and George Newell an enlisted man, and though the former was a farmer 
and the later a salesman, both entered the service with essentially the same plan. They 
wanted to gain promotion-perhaps a peacetime military position-and accumulate 
some capital to bring back home or pour into new business opportunities overseas. 
Most volunteer soldiers desperately wanted to prove their own valor in war. 
The adoring crowds that surrounded the volunteers as they departed Portland (and 
later San Francisco) made a strong impression on the troops, and the Oregon troops 
were anxious to retain the admiration of communities at home. H.C. Thompson's 
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memoir described crowds at Portland's camp McKinley and the doting women that 
met the soldiers at every train station between Portland and San Francisco. Volunteers 
paraded though crowds from Camp McKinley to Union Station and, in San Francisco, 
from the Presidio to the ships that carried them to the Philippines.1ffi Soldiers, in their 
journals and letters home, made proud comparisons between the Oregon regiment and 
those of other states, and they were quick to point out their roles in victories reported 
in the press. Many expressed dissatisfaction when not engaged in combat, fearing that 
others would return with all the glory. 
Racial Taxonomies 
From June of 1898 to February of 1899, most American soldiers in the Philippines had 
rather pedestrian assignments. Having arrived at Cavite after Dewey's brief, but 
mythic, naval victory, the U.S. soldiers spent June and July besieging the Spanish at 
Manila. The one-day conquest of the city, on August 13, was so swift and bloodless 
that the Oregon Volunteers were mere spectators to the one significant action against 
the enemy. In the occupation that followed, U.S. troops administered and guarded the 
City of Manila, while the Philippine insurgency occupied the suburbs. The relations 
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between the two armies soon soured, and many American soldiers anticipated the 
outbreak of war, although a tense peace persisted from August to February. The daily 
experiences of soldiers during these months were very different from those they later 
faced in combat. Most of the time, the members of the 2nd Oregon Volunteers were 
assigned guard duty or municipal administrative functions. Their lives were more like 
those of civilians soldiers in the field, and their duties afforded them considerable 
leisure time and permitted frequent interaction with the people of Manila. Diary 
entries and letters from these months read like the observations of ordinary travelers 
abroad; they described the customs and conditions of life for people that the writers 
understood neither as fellow citizens nor as enemies, but simply as interesting 
foreigners. Along with the predicable accounts about food, lodging, and vice, the 
soldiers provided what might be termed informal ethnographic commentary. They 
described, categorized, and evaluated the residents of Manila. This period of early 
observations provides valuable insight into the Americans' concept of their own racial 
and cultural identity relative to the Filipinos-before the experience of combat began 
to color their perspectives. 
It would be difficult to overstate the Oregon Volunteers' ignorance of the 
Philippines before their arrival. Oregon National Guardsmen had been called upon to 
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volunteer for foreign service the week before the United States' formal declaration of 
war against Spain, and they were already assembled at the hastily constructed Camp 
McKinley when news of Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet reached America.109 
As a result, these state militiamen were inducted into the army without any notion of 
their final destination. Most of the volunteers were in a state of confusion as they were 
shuffled from Portland to San Francisco, and their confusion continued through 
several stops in the Pacific en route to their ultimate destination. Aboard the Australia, 
a few days beyond Hawaii, Corporal Chriss A. Bell recorded in his diary a vague 
understanding of the mission: "It was rumored today that we will first go to the 
Ladrones about 1200 miles this side of the Phillipines [sic] and attempt to capture 
some Spanish gunboats and a town called Guam."110 Many years later, H.C. 
Thompson, who served with the Oregon Volunteers, recounted the familiar story of 
President McKinley searching a world map to find the Philippines on the eve of the 
war.111 Regardless of whether the story is true, it was widely believed, and it expressed 
a common perspective on the war. The Philippines was an inconceivably distant and 
exotic land. Just before his departure from San Francisco, Oregon Lieutenant George 
Telfer remarked, "If we get away on time-we will be the first American troops to 
cross the sea-and aside from the invasion of Mexico-the first to land on foreign 
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soil."112 Few of America's volunteers had ever been outside of the United States, and 
they viewed the expedition as not just a personal odyssey, but also a new and exotic 
undertaking for the nation. 
Most American soldiers knew little more about the Philippines upon arrival 
than they had upon elistment. The Oregon troops not only lacked equipment suitable 
to the climate and terrain; they lacked even the most rudimentary knowledge of the 
land and people. During neither their initial training in Portland, their subsequent 
training in San Francisco, nor their month-long ocean transit did they receive books, 
maps, or instruction. A soldiers' newspaper from Manila, reflected American 
ignorance of the Pacific: "Now that it has become universally known that there are 
such things as the Philippine Islands, we may look to see Manila ... making rapid 
strides toward the front of the commercial world."113 Early correspondence from 
Cavite and Manila reveals considerable confusion about the unfamiliar land. Nineteen-
year-old George Newell was surprised to find that the Filipinos "speak a language of 
their own" even though "the Country and climate is almost the same as Centrial [sic] 
America, [and] the natives dress and look the same."114 
Both America's metropolitan newspapers and those produced for circulation 
among the troops reflected an ill-informed fascination with the people of the 
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Philippines. The first issue of The Soldier's Letter, a newspaper printed for the troops 
in Manila, was not unlike the travel accounts of distant lands printed in the United 
States. Its lead article, which described the citizens of Manila, It revealed the 
difficulties American observers faced in categorizing the people of the Philippines and 
in understanding them in relation to the other peoples of the world: "the population is 
heterogeneous, being composed of natives and mestizas ('half-breeds'), Chinese, 
Europeans and Americans." The article struggled to describe a city that was both 
sophisticated and primitive to the American eye. Some of the inhabitants of Manila 
appeared uncivilized while others possessed the charms of a sophisticated urban 
culture. The American writer presented his own countrymen as both more advanced 
than the natives and less decadent than the Spaniards. Relative to the "medieval" 
Spanish colonial order, the Americans were represented as modem; relative to both 
Americans and Spaniards, the natives were primeval. The article, entitled "The City of 
Manila" described the old quarter as "medieval" and the new quarter as "just 
awakening from a slumber of the ages." The same perspective was reflected in the 
diary of Oregon Corporal Chriss A. Bell, which described Manila's ancient 
"grandeur," its state of decay, and its "modem speed."115 
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The Soldier's Letter categorized the locals according to civilization: 
cleanliness, commerce, order, and race. Here social class seemed to be just as 
important as race. The author divided both the Chinese and Filipinos by class, 
describing "those who are groveling in the lowest depths of civilization-(those who 
merely exist, but have not yet learned to live-such as the 'coolies' and illiterate 
Filipinos)," and also "the wealthy Chinese merchants" and the "educated 
Philipinas."116 Confused by the complexity of Manila, both journalists and common 
soldiers found confirmation for the prevailing cultural theories of their generation. The 
Filipino primitives were at the lowest rung of a social ladder, lacking all the gifts of 
civilization. Chinese day laborers received the same low estimate. Higher on the great 
chain of civilization were the Chinese merchants, the educated (hispanicised) 
Filipinos, and the Spaniards. But all of these cultural stations were considered 
transitory conditions on the way to an American future. In a letter to his wife, George 
Telfer proudly repeated the following comments of a Spanish resident: "You 
Americans are of the Anglo Saxon race. Your are of the coming race. You have 
whipped us at every point and within 15 years you will confront us in Spain. Nothing 
can stop you. We can't. It is destiny." 117 The American troops, who awaited the 
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conclusion of peace with Spain, saw themselves as the inevitable successors of the 
Spanish in the project of civilizing the world. 
American soldiers, having little knowledge of the Philippine population, 
categorized its constituents by analogy to the more familiar environment of the United 
States. To the American eye, Filipinos could seem like blacks, Chinese, Latin 
Americans, or Indians. Usually, the analogy contained within it an implicit judgment. 
During the summer and fall of 1898 these comparisons were often contemptuous or 
paternalistic, but rarely hostile. The Chinese and Spanish residents were measured 
against the Spaniards and Americans, on one hand, and against the natives, on the 
other. 
Oregon officer Charles Henry Martin was far from charitable in his description 
of the people of Manila. Industriousness and cleanliness were, to him, the essential 
features of civilization, and he believed them sorely lacking in the Philippines. In 
describing the poverty and filth of the city, he claimed that the "worthless natives live 
about like the Chinese," but also noted that "the Chinese are about the only people 
who do any labor here. All the Philopinos [sic] are a lazy, shiftless set who would 
rather steal than work."118 To Martin, the natives were indolent, the Chinese filthy but 
hard working, and the Spanish only a bit better: "None of the Spanish contingent here 
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really know how to live. Perhaps a few of the English may live tolerably well."119 In 
order to know how to live, one presumably had study and emulate Anglo-American 
conduct. He remarked that "when natives eat they look like so many animals."120 
Martin's disdain for foreign customs also extended to Catholicism. In 
describing the celebration of a feast day in Manila, Martin wrote to his wife that "the 
priests and all the rest who can afford it complete the festivities by getting drunk. Such 
is religion as it is understood by the native Filipinos. Undoubtedly you saw like shows 
in Southern Europe." 121 Clearly, he believed that those who "know how to live" were 
not to be found in the tropics of Asia, Latin America, or the Mediterranean, but only in 
the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant nations of the world. Even while heaping disapproval on 
the people of the Philippines, Martin was not without humor. In his exasperation over 
the complex political problems of the occupation, he remarked that "these Spaniards 
are really our best friends. But the whole affair is repulsively rotten."122 Implied in this 
comment was an idea that reoccurred in the letters of several American soldiers-
Although the Spanish were the declared enemy in the war, they were, in some sense, 
our partners in the Philippines. Though less advanced than their American, German, 
and English cousins, the Spaniards were representatives of Europe, and as such also 
struggling to spread civilization. 
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When Spanish forces surrendered Manila to the U.S. troops in August of 1898, 
they did so, in part, to avert conquest and occupation by the Philippine army that had 
also laid siege to the city. It was soon widely understood by American troops that their 
mission had now shifted to the protection of Spanish lives and property. It was widely 
believed that a lapse in American vigilance would result in the uncontrolled looting of 
the city by Aguinaldo's troops. As early as the end of August, Martin believed that the 
U.S. was "almost at hostilities with the insurgents who hate us almost as much as they 
did the Spanish troops. They were dreaming for months of the gold and riches they 
would get on the fall of the city + the fun they would have in cutting the throats of 
their old enemies."123 This notion, that the U.S. troops were now defending the 
Spaniards against the barbarians at the gates, was widely held. Oregon soldier Albert 
Southwick recalled, later in August, when the city was taken, "the insurgents expected 
we would allow them to come into the city and loot the stores and houses."124 Though 
he was far from the fighting and not entirely correct in his understanding of events, 
George Lemon Newell was sure that on the day Manila was taken, "The rebles [sic] 
an[d] natives begun to pillange [sic] and we had to stop them."125 Arthur Platts, during 
the first week inside the walls, reported with some anxiety that, "an attack by natives 
is feared, so we all sleep under arms." 126 The American soldiers in Manila, perhaps 
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especially Oregon Soldiers charged with guard duty, shared the feeling that 
civilization was under siege. The Spanish-and even the hispanicised Chinese and 
Filipinos in the city-were now understood as allies against the threat from without. 
As middle class officers, George Telfer and Charles Henry Martin considered 
themselves more educated and sophisticated than the enlisted men. 127 They, like the 
authors of the Soldier's Letter, attempted to understand the cultural and racial 
composition of the Philippines according to a global taxonomy. Telfer wrote that there 
were four distinct races. The Malay, the Spaniard, the Philipeno [sic] (mixture of 
Chinese & Malay) and a light colored race-a mixture of Spanish and Malay."128 
Evident in the comments of Oregon soldiers were the influences of the popular 
theories of the day regarding race, culture, climate, and color. But, in the early days of 
occupation, praise for the beauty of the people-particularly for women and 
children-was common. In a letter from July of 1898 George Telfer wrote: "this 
population is as perfect a physique as any race I have seen .... They are quick of 
thought and action."129 In a later letter, he went further in explaining his emerging 
notion of Philippine race taxonomy: 
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I send by this mail two photos-intended to show two types common to 
Manila. The Mestiza-is a mixture of Spanish and native-usually 
some Chinese blood as well. The picture shows the dress to 
perfection- but the face is not as beautiful as some. The Spanish 
woman has a large, sharp, pointed nose. The Mongolian in the Mestiza 
shows the flatter nose- making a perfect feature. The other picture 
shows the Fillipina or Tagal type-from which Mestiza is bred. The 
Mestiza is very light skinned- but black hair and eyes. The men 
(Mestizo) are very handsome."130 
Before the outbreak of war against the Filipinos in February of 1899, soldiers 
commented frequently on the pleasing appearance and physical vigor of the Filipinos. 
Also, as the passage above shows, the soldiers from Oregon had a tolerant eye for the 
mixing of races. Several Oregon soldiers, including Telfer, remarked on the beauty 
and sophistication of families in Hawaii and Philippines formed from mixed 
parentage. From Honolulu, Telfer wrote to his wife describing a local notable in this 
way: "Mrs. Humphrey is a sister of Mrs. Whitehead-the Chinese lady who married 
the naval officer and created such a sensation a year ago. Her father was Chinese 
Minister here. She has some of the look of a Japanese. She is very much a lady."131 
Apparently, such marriages among military men, though out of the ordinary, were not 
unheard of. Oregon soldier Arthur Platts spoke favorably of Captain Wilkenson, his 
Chinese wife, and their son who "looks like any Mexican boy. Very cute."132 The 
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intermarriages that produced a portion of the urban elites in Manila were approved of 
in the same light as these military marriages. 
Sometimes, the Americans associated superior physical or cultural traits of the 
Mestizos with the people of China or Japan, even while distinguishing the civilized 
Chinese and Japanese from the "chino" laborers of the United States. The Americans' 
experiences at home left them with an opinion of the Chinese as mysterious people 
with no regard for what they considered proper standards of cleanliness and order, but 
they also saw the Chinese as clever and resourceful in business. At the same time, the 
Oregonians had some notion of the venerable and impressive civilization of East Asia. 
They drew on an all of these notions in categorizing and describing the Chinese and 
mestizo populations of the Philippines. Albert Southwick' s letters to his family use a 
palette of American images to illustrate his understanding of Manila to his family at 
home: "[there are] business houses that compare favorably with our own at home but 
the Chinese here have the upper hand .... they are not like the Chinese at home and 
must come from a different part of China. Some are very large over 6ft and well 
built."133 While noting their prominent position in the commerce of Manila, Southwick 
explains that the businesses "kept by the Chinese ... are dark and dirty like those of 
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home only more so."134 These he compares unfavorably to the shops of the French and 
Japanese. 
The Americans distinguished between the Chinese engaged in commerce and 
those that they viewed as common laborers and thus akin to the railroad workers and 
porters of the United States. Stuart Creighton Miller, in "Benevolent Assimilation," 
notes that the use of forced Chinese labor by the American military in the Philippines 
was common. 135 His claim is corroborated by the papers of Oregon soldiers who 
express no surprise at the practice. Oregon Volunteer H.C. Thomson described his 
comrades in the Second Oregon conscripting "Chinos" at gunpoint to carry their 
supplies.136 Even some who made no mention of forced labor believed it something of 
a caste entitlement to have the Chinese carry their loads. George Telfer remarked with 
annoyance that "In a country were Chinamen abound and where they carry 
everything-and where wages are low-it seems absurd to punish soldiers by making 
them beasts of burden."137 The implication is clear that in the Philippines, as in the 
U.S., the Chinese were and ought to be beasts of burden. 
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Visions of the Filipino inside and outside the Walls 
The Oregonians' racial characterization of the Filipinos shifted in response to the 
changing relationship between the U.S. troops and the native population. From the 
outset, Americans described the Philippine revolutionary army in very different terms 
than the population of Manila. From the time that the Americans took control of 
Manila in August of 1898, the Oregon Volunteers, who were usually assigned to 
guarding the city, regarded the residents as their wards and the army beyond the walls 
as their potential enemy. Their feeling toward the Manilans was sometimes scornful 
and sometimes paternalistic, but never hostile. The Oregonians recorded fewer 
thoughts about the Philippine Army, but when they did so, they described the 
followers of Aguinaldo as devious and dangerous. Sometimes they were called 
"natives" or "Tagalogs" in contrast to the "Filipinos" of the city. Still, the most hostile 
racial characterizations of the Filipinos were not recorded by the Volunteers until they 
were engaged in face-to-face combat with them. Only then did Aguinaldo's soldiers 
become "niggers" and "Indians" in the eyes of the Oregonians. 
Americans, transported into the midst of the unfamiliar and complex Philippine 
population, were capable of seeing the inhabitants as African or as American Indians. 
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It seems unlikely that this is entirely accountable to any morphological similarities 
among the three populations. After all, at home in the United States, White Americans 
saw Blacks and Indians as distinct races. American soldiers abroad assigned racial 
identities, not just on the basis of appearance or language, but also in response to their 
perceptions of the foreign individuals and to the circumstances of the encounter. 
Depending on whether a particular group of Filipinos was seen as modern or 
primitive, poor or rich, friends or enemies, urban or rural, American observers might 
assign to them the identity of "Negro," "Oriental," "Native" or "Indian." City people 
of the same ethnicity might be called "Filipinos" or "Darkeys"; rural people were 
more likely to be called "natives" or by a tribal name. Most striking, however is the 
Oregon soldiers' use of the terms "nigger" and "Indian," terms that appear in letters 
and diaries only after the volunteers entered into heavy fighting. In the thousands of 
pages of extant personal papers, the word "nigger" is never applied to the Filipinos 
prior to the soldiers' first experiences in combat, but is frequently the preferred term 
thereafter. Soldiers used "nigger," like "Indian," to describe their enemies while U.S. 
troops were engaged in combat, the destruction of villages, torture, or spot executions. 
Both the narratives and their terminology show a psychological shift for the soldiers, 
from an attitude of detached observation or casual paternalism to a psychology of race 
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war. Under these conditions, the common earlier distinctions between combatants and 
non-combatants disappeared. Both the friendly paternalistic outlook and its very 
language are lost. 
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The Black Filipino138 
George F. Telfer 
George Telfer's letters are those of a devoted family man. He wrote warmly and 
frequently to his wife and children, and their welfare was ever present in his mind. 
During the months of waiting in Manila, he had a kind eye for the Spanish and 
Filipino families of the city. In July 1898, after dining with a native family, he praised 
the food and music and remarked that their "manners are enough of the latin race to be 
pleasing-but backed by greater depth of feeling which makes you like them."139 He 
wrote of his neighbors and of the families that he saw in public places in the same 
affectionate tone. Though he had plenty of criticism for Spanish administration, 
commerce, and education, he viewed Spanish families in a different light, maintaining 
that "Spanish children and Spanish mothers are the same as American children and 
American mothers."140 
Telfer was fond of quoting Kipling and, in fact, shared the writer's attitude 
toward the colonized people of the world.141 He was fascinated by the idea of racial 
characteristics and subscribed to contemporary notions of them. He believed that 
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Anglo-Saxon peoples had a historical mandate for leadership, but envisioned this 
leadership as benevolent. Like Kipling, he was fond of the "native children," even 
seeking their company as a diversion from his monotonous duties: "One of my sources 
of amusement are the native children. They are like the darkey babies-only smarter. . 
. . They have negro features and white teeth. They are musical and catch all the 
popular airs."142 During his months of civil duty, this romanticized yet condescending 
pickaninny motif appears several times. On another occasion he wrote, "The native 
children have lots of fun. They are like the darkeys down south- and can make fun 
out of anything. They stay out doors all day-and play just the same."143 
Telfer had begun his military career as a member of the Minnesota National 
Guard. There he had served in the suppression of two Indian uprisings-a set of 
experiences that seem to have shaped his later attitude toward war in the Philippines. 
In his letters from the summer and fall of 1898, he never likened the Filipinos to 
Indians or referred to his past duties in Indian wars. Then, in mid-January, as tensions 
between the Philippine and American armies approached the boiling point, he began to 
analyze the situation through the lens of these past experiences. He became annoyed 
that, because no official state of war existed between the Filipinos and Americans, the 
troops were not permitted to engage Aguinaldo's army: "You know this is one of the 
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annoying things about our system of government. It was always so with the Indian. 
The officers of the army would know that the Indians were preparing for an 
outbreak-but the authorities at Washington would order 'hands off".i44 
Telfer continued his civil duties in Manila, as a judge-advocate, becoming all 
the while more frustrated with the situation. He saw in the other men symptoms of 
ongoing tension and declining standards of humanity: "We still 'don't fight.' We kill a 
man or so every night, but that is poor satisfaction. The men [on guard duty] are 
getting so ugly that they use great deliberation when aiming at any person they desire 
to stop." 145 Following the outbreak of the war, Telfer continued retained his duties in 
the city. During this period, he considered the Filipino troops crafty and dishonest, 
noting that the enemies of one night's engagement would appear in the guise of 
friends the following morning. 146 Yet he also noted that in the first battle of the war the 
"natives ... fought stubbornly and surprisingly well."147 He neither glossed over the 
faults of the American army nor to demonized the enemy. However, in mid-March, 
when Telfer's assignment was shifted from civil administration and guard duty to field 
command, his attitude toward the war and the Filipinos changed drastically. 
In a letter recounting his first day in the field, Telfer reported the strategy and 
movements of forces with dispassionate precision. On the second day, his troops 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -1 
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looted the area of their deployment with great gusto and an apparently clean 
consciences: "So we all enjoy life. Yesterday the men went on a foraging expedition 
and have been living on chicken, eggs ducks and young pigs."148 On March 20, Telfer 
and his troops took part in the of Battle Laguna De Bay, the pressure and fear of which 
seems to have shocked him into an entirely different state of mind. Though he had 
before likened to an Indian outbreak, Telfer had never referred to the Filipinos 
themselves as Indians. Yet, somehow, in the strain of battle, the two racial categories 
collapsed into each other in his mind. Even two days after the battle, he recounted his 
thoughts while resting after a grueling advance as follows: "I wet my handkerchief and 
washed my face and cooled my head. Then I considered my chances of standing off 
any stray party of Indians who might seek to gather me in. I had not used my revolver, 
so had a belt full of ammunition and decided that they would have a hard time getting 
me." After rising from this rest, Telfer wrote, "We burned every house we passed."149 
From this point forward, Telfer' s tale has much in common with the other 
accounts that have survived. He and his band of about two dozen men helped to carry 
out a loosely coordinated campaign to root out the Philippine army and its supporters. 
They sometimes engaged in battles against regular formations across open fields, 
trenches, or simple fortifications, but most battles were just brief skirmishes a long 
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war of terror against the inhabitants of the area. Like the Indian wars with which 
Telfer clearly associated it, this campaign was not a tidy war of position. It required 
the intimidation of a large population to prevent civilians from giving aid and comfort 
to the Philippine Army. When not in battle, Telfer's men displaced villagers and 
looted their homes, or seized their homes and made them act as servants. 150 Between 
regular engagements, Oregon troops tried to root out small bands of adversaries in 
what most referred to as "nigger hunts." Telfer, who never before used the word to 
describe Filipinos, adopted it to describe his enemies during this campaign. It is clear 
that his humanitarian standards began to change as well. While he had once been 
critical of the trigger-happy guards, Telfer' s accounts of battles in March and April 
show no remorse over the enemy dead, or even for battlefield executions: "I remember 
jumping trenches-seeing mangled bodies, writhing figures, and hearing groans 
everywhere. But through it all but one line of thought was in my mind- 'Guide right.' 
'preserve touch.' 'Advance' 'Lay Down' 'Forward' - 'Kill' 'Kill' - 'Take no 
prisoners.-Then dropping-out of breath and panting."151 The fear and confusion of 
battle is palpable in his letters, but these battles seem to have left him psychologically 
transformed. Even in moments of relative safety, Telfer retained his desire for a war or 
extermination. His cynical amusement with the project is chilling. In a letter to his 
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wife, Telfer described his daily routine without apology: "We perform no duty during 
the day-but put out pickets at night. Scouting parties are made up from 
volunteers-every now and then. It is great fun for the men to go on 'nigger hunts.' 
The air would be delightful were it not for the odor from dead niggers which have 
been left unburied .... We received some Krg-Jorgenson [sic] rifles today. So now we 
can reach Mr. Nig. at his own distance." 152 
Albert Southwick 
Albert Southwick, a private in the Second Oregon Volunteers was a prolific 
correspondent to his mother and sisters. Like George Telfer, Southwick describes the 
residents of the Philippines in relation to racial groupings that were familiar to him 
from the United States. Southwick did not share Telfer' s early fondness for the 
children and families the Philippines, but he was by no means hostile to the Filipinos 
at the time of his arrival. Southwick' s racial classification of Filipinos, like Telfer' s, 
changed in response to the relationship between the U.S. forces and the occupied 
population. 
In his first encounter with Filipinos, Southwick's attitude was neutral, and he 
classed them among Asian races. Even before disembarking in the Philippines, he set 
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down the following observations: ''The natives are all around the ship this morning in 
their canoes trying to sell their fruit chickens and eggs .... they look a good deal like 
chinese only darker."153 From the deck of the ship, Southwick observed the efforts of 
the Philippine insurgency against the Spanish citadel with interest, but without 
perceptible sympathies in the contest, "The insurgents are busy here alright they have 
been burning the outlying part of Manila for some time .... they have an engagement 
every day with the Spanish troops."154 Only following the U.S. capture of Manila and 
amidst the disputes over zones of occupation, did Southwick develop a hostile attitude 
toward the Filipinos. As his attitude changed, so did his racial classification of ihe 
Filipino. His original notion of Filipinos as "like chinese" was replaced by a notion of 
Filipinos as Black. Following his first mention of minor scuffles between the 
Philippine and American forces, Southwick revealed this shift in his thinking when he 
announced that, "next time they get into a fight there will be quite a funeral of black 
men."155 
Throughout the fall of 1898, Southwick's letters devoted little attention to the 
insurgents. One entry showed both contempt for the Filipinos and the conviction 
shared by many of his fellows that the native forces were lingering beyond the gates 
because their chief desire was plunder: ''The insurgents expected we would allow 
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them to come into the city and loot the stores and houses."156 Nonetheless, with few 
major conflicts between the two armies during the fall, Southwick never again gave 
voice to his early predictions of a ''funeral of black men." During these months he 
generally wrote of other subjects all together, and when he did write of the Philippine 
soldiers, he described them as "natives" or in military terms such as "insurgents." 
In January, during the same weeks that Telfer described the growing anxiety 
and bellicosity of the guards, Southwick returned to his reflections on native character: 
"The natives still keep up their reputation for treachery, and have knifed two sentries 
this last week; but there were two Filipino funerals as a consequence." 157 With the 
outbreak of war in February, Southwick's correspondence focused almost exclusively 
on military matters. He saw combat sooner than Telfer did, but it seems to have 
affected the same sudden shift in his racial characterization of the Filipinos. In his first 
account of battle, Southwick refered to Filipinos as "niggers" -a term he had never 
used before, but often used thereafter. 
In the midst of combat, Filipinos, whether they were enemies under arms, the 
wounded, the dead, or civilians, no longer looked to Southwick "like chinese," as they 
had eight months before; they were all now "niggers." Upon first seeing the enemy 
dead up close, Southwick noted without further comment: "found 2 wounded niggers 
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and 7 dead ones."158 In the entries that followed, it becomes clear that Southwick came 
to believe all Filipinos were enemies and that all were "niggers." He noted with 
disgust that he and his companions kept finding "niggers" who claimed to be "amigo 
Philipino [sic ]."159 The American soldiers treated them as enemies, heedless of 
protestations to the contrary, and either executed them or used them for forced labor. 
He mentions that the mobility of field artillery positions was enabled by "the Hoskiss 
[Hotchkiss field gun] being hauled by a lot of 'nigger' prisoners."160 Southwick's men 
made a general attack on all people and property within the area of their military 
operations. The following passages are typical: "the 'nigs' were so well hidden and 
using smokeless powder, it was almost impossible to find any of them, but we filled 
the trees full of lead .... we sent a shot into every clump of bush and houses, thick 
leaved trees, or anything that looked like a place for a 'nigger' to hide."161 It is clear 
that Southwick often feared for his life in the heat of battle, but it is also clear that he 
enjoyed certain aspects of war. Among his favorite activities were what he called 
"nigger hunting," "foraging," and hunting for "curios" and "relics." By these terms, he 
meant tracking down and killing Filipino enemies and looting the area for food, drink, 
and valuables. 162 
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In war, Southwick considered his enemies black, savage, and undeserving of 
the normal protections of civilized treatment. His racial classification of the Filipinos 
appears to have been shaped by his position in the conflict. It is noteworthy that 
Southwick, like most other Oregon soldiers, had seen the Hawaiians as a beautiful and 
capable people, in the context of their warm reception of Americans in Honolulu: 
"Natives ... are much better looking people than I expected and seem be quite 
intelligent."163 Southwick had not associated the Hawaiians with Africans, just as he 
had not judged the Filipinos whom he met in June of 1898 as blacks. Southwick's 
desire to understand friends as more civilized and his enemies as more savage is so 
pronounced that U.S. military cooperation with the Macabebes in the spring of 1899 
required him to introduce some subtle ethnographic distinctions. In explaining the 
situation to his family he first wrote, "there are several distinct tribes on this island. 
Only one of which [the Tagalogs] are connected to this insurrection." These are the 
enemies that Southwick considered "niggers." The Macabebes, who were hostile to 
the Taglalogs, and whom the U.S. was now using as scouts are now redefined by 
Southwick. Later, he remarked with approval, that "one tribe, the Macabebes, which is 
probably the most civilized," have joined the army of General Otis.164 This is a 
fascinating reassessment. Before the outbreak of hostilities with the Philippine 
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independence movement, Southwick followed the usual convention of associating 
civilization with urbanization and westernization. By this standard, the Tagalogs, who 
were the largest Philippine ethnic group in the city of Manila, would have seemed the 
most civilized. Yet, as enemies, Southwick came to regard them as barbarians, even 
while seeing the Macabebe tribesmen as a promising, "civilized" group. 
Chriss A. Bell 
Corporal Chriss A. Bell of the Oregon Volunteers was an educated young man who 
planned to return to Oregon and enter the legal profession after the war. 165 His diary 
recorded the whole period of his service, from the time of the Australia's arrival in 
Guam in June of 1898 to the time of his departure for home a year later. At the 
beginning of his deployment, Bell's ideas about the racial identity of the Filipinos 
were still fluid. His social contacts outside American circles in Manila appear to have 
been far broader than those of his fellow soldiers. During the early occupation of the 
city, he remained open-minded about the people of the Philippines, making his 
observations on the basis of his own individual encounters. Bell had trouble defining 
the race of Pacific islanders early in his travels, and his first descriptions of the 
Filipinos and the Philippine army were not dominated by the idea of race. Later in the 
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war against them, Bell described all the inhabitants of the war zone as "savages" or 
"niggers." But before going into combat, Bell had showed some concern for the 
welfare of the population in combat zones. During his final months in the Philippines, 
Bell recorded his conviction that the barbarism of the enemy required and justified a 
total assault on the general populace. 
Before reaching the Philippines, Bell recorded the following observations on 
the Hawaiian natives: "the Kanakas are lazy good natured folk not unlike our Indians 
or a cross between an Indian or Negro." 166 He found them attractive and pleasant, but 
also believed them to "have no morals." 167 Bell had a similar response to the 
Filipinos-he saw them as simple people, still in their moral childhood. His 
comparisons to American Blacks and Indians placed the peoples of the Pacific in the 
racial category of uncivilized peoples that should be governed and protected as 
subjects, but not treated as citizens. Controlling them, he came to believe, would 
require harsh treatment. 
While stationed in Manila after its capture, Bell recorded more comments on 
Spaniards than Filipinos. Like George Telfer, he made social visits to affluent Spanish 
families, and had a soft spot for the children of the town. After several such visits, he 
remarked in September of 1898, "There was a number of young folks from babies up. 
McEnroe 88 
Had a pleasant time especially with the boys and girls."168 His attitude toward 
Spaniards was warm, but he seems to have viewed them as a people in decline. The 
language he used to describe all things Spanish communicated a sense of decadence 
and degeneration. He praised the architectural works of the Spanish, even while noting 
that "There is a general air of ancient grandeur gone to decay."169 Likewise, he 
observed that "Once in a while are seen a Spanish woman that is very handsome but 
they seem to decay early."170 Though he had no high regard for the Spanish army as a 
fighting force, Bell found that they were "decent fellows and treat us fine." 171 
During the summer and fall of 1898, Bell did not describe the Philippine Army 
in racial terms, but he held its members in low regard. After noting the Spanish troops' 
disdain for the insurgents, Bell remarked, "I do not blame them, for a dirtier, lower, 
more disgusting lot of fellows I cannot conceive."172 Bell came to regard the 
insurgents as an incompetent fighting force, but he still described the emerging 
conflict between the U.S. and Philippine armies in political or military, rather than 
racial, terms. The week before the war broke our, he continued to describe Aguinaldo 
as an enemy military leader with a poorly organized force. Bell's diary entry 
expressed his belief in "Auginaldo's hopes of settling difficulties without bloodshed" 
while attributing ever-more dangerous incidents to the fact that "The troops near the 
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[state of] Washington boys are not Aguinaldo's personal force, but under another 
insurgent leader. He wishes to fight & it seems difficult for Aguinaldo to hold his 
own."173 
When the war began, Bell was a fairly even-handed observer. He judged the 
relative strengths and weakness of the two armies, and found the American force far 
superior, yet his comments show no sense of racial hostility. The following tactical 
observations are typical of his commentary. In the first days of the war, he wrote: ''The 
natives are but poor fighters and do not understand our style of charging under fire." 174 
Though Bell held the enemy army in contempt, he was concerned for the welfare of 
the populace. He described the first American advance thus: "Natives were killed by 
the hundreds. They did so much shooting from the bamboo huts that an order came to 
fire the huts as the men advanced. This was done & men, women and children 
suffered."175 Bell was also concerned by the callous treatment of Filipinos in Manila as 
the war began, noting, "In [the] evening two natives were shot within 30 feet of me 
apparently [there was] no cause as neither of them had any sort of weapon."176 
In Hawaii, Bell had thought of the natives as somewhere between "our 
Indians" and "negros." Standing duty in the city of Manila as the war began, Bell was 
a distant observer to the Army's destruction of Filipino villages, and he tended to see 
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the victims more as Indians than as Negroes. He used the term "natives," in most 
cases, and had some concern for the treatment of non-combatants, though little for the 
enemy army. He viewed the Philippine army as "savage" and nearly beyond the 
control of its officers. In a February diary entry, he told the story of "An incident. .. 
which showed native character." Philippine soldiers apparently fired on an American 
general's delegation that was approaching a Filipino general under flag of truce. Bell 
recorded that the "native general" was "forced to admit that his men were untamed 
savages without the first principle of humanity and apologized for being a part of such 
a disgraceful affair."177 Bell thought of the armed Filipinos as unpredictable and 
savage, but he described civilians differently, he believed they were entitled to 
reasonable protection against the ravages of war. 
By April, Bell had been subjected to tough combat conditions, and his attitude 
had hardened. Though he had once worried about the fate of the local population, he 
now wrote that the Filipinos "have caused so much trouble & murdered so many of 
our boys that that they [U.S. soldiers] recognize them no longer but shoot on sight all 
natives. Natives will not or cannot understand kind & civilized treatment. If you treat 
them as equals they will think you are afraid of them & murder you."178 He justifies 
the abandonment of ordinary codes of war on the grounds that the natives fought 
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"contrary to all civilized warfare."179 By May, Bell had been through terrifying combat 
experiences that cemented his sense of racial hostility. His reports of battle casualties 
reflected this new outlook: "About 700 niggers attacked MacArthur in the forenoon ... 
. there were about 100 niggers killed and wounded."180 Bell's diary entries show the 
connection between intense, visceral fear and race-hatred: "[they] warned us the gugus 
were in front. .. the gugus opened fire their aim was poor ... We could see but few 
gugus though they could see us and as we came through the field the range was good 
and bullets whistled all around .... [I] was sick to my stomach & puked but would 
rather have been shot than quit."181 
Willis Arthur Platts 
Willis Arthur Platts left behind a diary with entries spanning the whole year of the 
Oregon Volunteers' deployment in the Philippines. Like Chriss Bell, Willis Platts 
came to the Philippines without any detectable sense of racial hostility toward the 
inhabitants. He had a tolerant view of intermarriage between Americans and Asians, 
and he never employed hostile racial language until he was in the thick of combat for 
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the first time. 182 Like Bell, however the experience of battle produced a radical change 
in his notion of the moral boundaries of warfare and in his sense of race. 
At the time of his arrival in the Philippines, Platts described the inhabitants' 
physical characteristics, but without attempting categorize them in relation to any 
racial schema. In July of 1898, he wrote that the Filipinos were "small and very dark, 
[and] wear very little clothing," but he did not employ the race vocabulary of the 
United States. 183 To describe the inhabitants of Luzon, Platts used the words "natives" 
and "Filipinos" interchangeably. He sometimes described the Philippine army in 
strictly military terms as the "insurgency" of the "Philippine Army;" at other times, his 
use of the word "natives" seems to emphasize their primitivism. 
As an observer to the battles surrounding Manila in early February, Platts 
believed American brutality was warranted by the Filipinos' violations of civilized 
conventions of warfare: ''They say our boys raised the cry of no quarter ([I] am glad of 
it) and disregarded the numerous white flags because of many treacherous deeds."184 
Though Platts was unconcerned by battlefield executions of enemy soldiers, he was 
initially disturbed by the widespread assaults on civilians. A few days later, he noted 
without concern that "Nearly all of the Regts are foraging now, have chickens, pigs 
and anything else they want. .. [they take any] carriage that they see and make it their 
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own, houses and buildings are looted and burned as they go .... every native carries a 
pole with a white flag on it."185 
By the end of the month, Platts found himself in the midst of the kind of 
warfare that he had criticized from the walls of Manila. In the first description of his 
own experiences with "street fighting," Platts appears to have abandoned all moral 
distinction between the killing of male combatants and non-combatants, but he shows 
real remorse for the death of women and children: 
"[We] would fire into a house and when the natives would run fire at 
them and generally they tumbled. Fired each house after we had looted 
it and driven the women and children back .... Grover Todd and 
myself fired about 8 shots into the bottom of a hut about 3 feet from the 
ground then ran forward and breaking open the doors rushed in to find 
2 men and 3 women all unhurt. They had lain flat and the bullets had 
passed through am glad now that they did .... before the fight was over 
had to witness the painful sight of many women shot." 186 
Platt' s diary entries from combat zones show a steadily deteriorating concern for the 
welfare of the Filipinos, despite the fact that he was initially more anguished by the 
commission of atrocities than were many of his comrades. 
Platts did not describe his first battles as race conflicts, but his accumulated 
combat experiences wore down his original sense of war ethics. His entries became 
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increasingly callous with hard experience. At the end of the day described above, 
Platts concluded "estimates of the day's work are natives lost killed and wounded 150. 
Amer. 2 killed and 4 wounded, near 1000 native huts burned and a good time for 
all." 187 It is noteworthy that his combat statistics in no way distinguished between 
enemy soldiers and common Filipinos. From this point forward, Platts began to 
describe killing Filipinos in the same terms he used to describe killing animals for 
sport. Working in coordination with boats crews armed with Gatling guns, Platts and 
his comrades moved north from Manila toward the enemy capital at Malolos, "killing 
and burning all we meet." 188 He remarked frequently on the good fun had by the 
Oregon soldiers: "All the boys are contented and happy .... killed a couple hundred 
ducks and chickens today." The soldiers spent their free time looting, swimming, and 
shooting at dogs and birds for sport. 189 
Though increasingly hardened to combat and inured to violence, if not amused 
by it, Platts only developed a racial conception of the struggle late in his tour of duty. 
In mid-March, after surveying a field of wounded and dead enemy soldiers, his 
commitment to total war crystallized: "After seeing this I can have no pity for the 
natives." 190 True to his word, Platts never thereafter betrayed any thought of 
compassion for the Filipinos. The shift in racial categorization observable in other 
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soldiers' papers appeared in the next entry of Platts' diary: "niggers attempted to cross 
the bridge but was met by a terrific fire from Lieut. Kelly's Platoon."191 Following the 
route at the bridge, Platts reported that "The boys of our little camp were so 
encouraged about it that they scattered out and burned every house anywhere near and 
whenever 'an amigo' showed up generally put him to sleep ... I know of quite a 
number they killed, even shot at many myself."192 Platts' attitude toward the Filipinos 
was, by the end of his service, very different from what it was at the war's beginning. 
By April, the "natives" had become "niggers" and even those who proclaimed 
themselves "amigos" were really enemies. He considered all villages reasonable 
targets of the war, and believed that anyone fleeing from a burning home could and 
should be shot. 
Joseph G. Evans and Elliot Rodgers 
The extant personal papers of some Oregon Volunteers are very limited and provide 
only a fragmentary portrait of their year in the Philippines. Yet, these accounts also 
conform to the patterns noted in more complete diaries and collections of 
correspondence. They suggest that soldiers under combat conditions developed an idea 
of the U.S.-Phlippine war as a racial struggle. Soldiers' descriptions of the race of their 
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adversaries became more definite and more hostile, and this change was accompanied 
by an increased acceptance of brutality against enemy soldiers and civilians. 
Joseph G. Evans' few extant letters illustrate the sharp contrast between his 
first impressions of the Filipinos during their struggle against Spain, and his notion of 
them during their war against American annexation. Early in the fight against Spain, 
Evans described the American capture of a Spanish force and the release of Filipino 
sepoys with some approbation for the character of the native people: ''The 150 native 
soldiers were released as they were friendly and of a peaceable tum of mind, and in 
order to show their love for a nation that has ruled them with an 'iron hand,' as soon as 
they were freed, the native soldiers tore their buttons and other insignia of rank from 
their clothing."193 In the summer of 1898, describing the Filipinos as a decent and 
mistreated people, Evans was not particularly concerned with their race. However, a 
year later, while fighting against them, Evans' writing emphasized the race of his 
adversaries in almost every sentence. He recalled that the Washington Volunteers 
were "chasing the niggers till they had them cornered at the water's edge .... the 
niggers call the Springfield's, piccaninni cannon .... the Springfield wound is 
generally a dead nigger."194 
McEnroe 97 
Oregon soldier Elliot Rodgers left behind a journal of his combat experiences 
in April and May of 1899. Because the diary contains no earlier entries, it is not 
certain what his attitude toward the Filipinos was prior to combat. However, this diary 
of the spring campaigns provides valuable information about his thoughts on race 
during the fighting. Rodgers placed the enemy in the same category as American 
Blacks. His descriptions of battles combined military and racial terminology, 
sometimes shifting between the two lexicons mid-sentence: "the insurgents has [sic] 
some big guns but do not know how to use them. The negroes fell back and the 
brigade took the town."195 In another instance he recounted the casualties as follows: 
"The Coons attacked the Kansas regiment. ... The Mon. +Kan. Regiments went after 
the coons and killed about 100 and captured 30."196 
The racial distinctions made in Rodgers' writing show that his understanding 
of a man's race was determined by context and relationship more than by appearance, 
language or custom. To Rodgers, a "Coon" or a "negro" was, by definition, an enemy. 
This becomes especially clear in his description of the enemy soldiers as "Negroes" in 
contrast to friendly Filipinos whom he does not view as black. Consider the following 
description of the Philippine Army's attack on the town of San Fernando: "The report 
here is that the Negros killed a 1,000 Philipinoes [sic]+ Chinese and threw them into 
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the church before setting fire to it."197 Somehow he was able to view pro-American, 
Chinese-Filipinos as "Chinese," and pro-American ethnic Filipinos as "Philipinoes," 
but in Rodgers' mind, those hostile to the U.S. occupation became "negroes." 
The Filipino as Indian 
The Oregon Volunteers with combat experience had gained it in Indian wars. Between 
the end of the Civil War and the outbreak of the Spanish American war, the only 
significant U.S. military actions had been against Indian tribes in the West. Though a 
few aged officers in the Spanish American and Philippine wars were Civil War 
veterans, the overwhelming majority of the soldiers in the regular and volunteer 
armies were men of a younger generation. It is not surprising, under the 
circumstances, that America's western wars against bands of Indian irregulars, fought 
to assert U.S. sovereignty over indigenous peoples, would guide Americans' 
understanding of the Philippine War. It is surprising that so many soldiers identified 
the enemy as "negro." This notwithstanding, the vision of the Filipinos as Indians and 
of the war as "Indian war" exercised an important influence on the Oregon soldiers.198 
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Edward E. Kelly, a law school graduate and former telegraph operator from 
North Dakota, having volunteered in the Midwest, was probably assigned to serve 
with the Oregon Volunteers because of his technical expertise.199 A special feature in 
the Chicago Sunday Chronicle lauded Kelly's technical feats in battlefield cable 
communications and presented an interview with Kelly on the course of the war and 
the future of the Philippines. Kelly was just as clear in identifying the Filipinos with 
Indians as other soldiers were in identifying them as Blacks. As a member of the 
North Dakota militia, Kelly's past outlook on U.S.-Indian relations seems to have 
provided him with a blueprint for understanding the war in the Philippines. 
Kelly's description of the enemy might just as easily have been applied to a 
number of Indian adversaries of previous decades: "The Tagalogs are warlike, but they 
are also primitive and have had enough of us." Kelly was confident that America was 
prevailing in the conflict, but cautious about the prospects for a stable peace: "[Kelly] 
is of the opinion that the backbone of the uprising has been broken, but does not hope 
that native tribes will accept civilization with reasonable speed if at all. He looks for 
years of predatory warfare like those which formerly raged on the borders of the 
United States with the Red men."200 
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Edward Kelly understood the Philippines as a frontier territory of the United 
States and the inhabitants as primitive Indians, resistant to the inevitability of 
American sovereignty, and too uncivilized to trust or enfranchise. He considered the 
natives "lazy, savage, and little inclined to adopt new ideas. They would rather remain 
as they are than to improve." For Kelly, the essence of historical improvement was 
assimilation into American culture. Even the fact that the Filipinos had not adopted 
American dress in the course of the was, in Kelly's eyes, and impediment to their 
ascent from savagery. Having defined the Philippines as a frontier territory and the 
Filipinos as natives, Kelly recommended an administrative policy modeled on the 
American reservation system and a military policy based on Indian wars: "I am 
satisfied that it will be many years before any striking change will be noted. We are 
facing the same condition over there that we faced on our own frontiers for so long. 
The same treatment will be needed to train the Filipinos to the habits of 
civilization."201 
Lieutenant George Telfer's, past experience suppressing Indian uprisings 
informed his perception of the standoff between the American and Philippine forces in 
January of 1899. In January, Telfer analyzed the situation in the Philippines by 
conscious analogy to American Indian wars.202 However, once personally involved in 
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the fighting, Telfer's identification of Filipinos with Indians seems to have become 
less conscious. In March, during a break in the fighting at Laguna Bay, Telfer worried 
about his "chances of standing off any stray party of Indians."203 When he say enemies 
face-to-face, he called them "niggers," but unseen attackers from the jungle he called 
"Indians." 
Even young soldiers who had never fought in Indian wars drew on the 
experiences of their elders. George Newell, who was only nineteen when he enlisted, 
absorbed the idea of the conflict as "indian war" from his superiors: "General Oties 
[Otis] expects to subdue the insurgents before long, but I think it will take 2 or 3 years . 
. . . I have heard officers say that this is the worst Indian fighting they ever seen."204 
For some, the association of Filipinos with Indians derived from past 
experiences in war. Yet, this analogy seems to have other roots as well. For Americans 
from the Western United States, Indians were people under American authority, but 
outside of American civilization. Indians represented all things uncivilized and 
external to the American culture. George Telfer, who so revered Kipling, saw America 
as a partner in a great Anglo-Saxon project to civilize the world. Charles Henry Martin 
had a similar perspective. To him, America's conflict with the Spanish was a sideshow 
to the broader European objective of civilizing the world. In this global project, the 
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Spanish were just incompetent allies, while the Philippine nationalists were the real 
enemy. In August of 1898 he wrote, "The Spaniards are really our best friends .... the 
natives have no single virtue to redeem them. They are infinitely lower and viler than 
our indians."205 
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A curious coincidence noticed by most of all the members of the 
regiment was that a fight was in progress very near the same spot where 
the insurgents were attacking the Spaniards the hour the first expedition 
entered the harbor. The antagonists were changed .... Oregon hearts 
since stilled by Filipino bullets, beat with sympathetic and eager 
feelings, were now on the eve of the regiment's departure, more 
stubbornly fighting their erstwhile friends .... At each shot the boys 
would ejaculate: 'the niggers are getting it. When the same men heard 
the roar of old muzzle-loaders in the hands of the Philippinos fighting 
the Spanish they said: 'give it to the greasers.' 
-Oregonian, July 17, 1899 
IV. Conclusion 
Both the Oregonians who fought in the Philippines and those who merely observed the 
war through the press expressed similar ideas of America's historical identity and 
global mission. To soldiers and readers alike, the Philippine war became a fulfillment 
of America's racial destiny to expand westward, claim the world's wasteland's for 
civilization, and pacify or eliminate less capable peoples who stood in its path. Young 
Oregonians, removed from the their already mythic pioneer predecessors by only a 
few decades, reapplied elements of the familiar frontier narrative to this new national 
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undertaking. Yet, as the story was reworked to suit the needs of the present, new 
elements were added to it. 
While the United States vied with European empires for greater influence in 
distant lands, Oregonians redefined themselves as both uniquely American and as 
proteges of Great Britain. The patriotism that emerged from these sources was both 
national and racial in character, but bereft of political ideology. The idea of America 
as uniquely graced by its republican doctrines was ill suited to the conquest of distant 
peoples. The American psyche resolved this dilemma by rejecting the notion of 
America as a great political entity and replacing it with the notion of America as a 
great racial entity. 
The concept of the U.S. military expedition as a racial project took hold in the 
winter of 1898 as the Filipino enemy replaced the Spanish one. Americans invented 
themselves as Anglo-Saxon conquerors while increasingly characterizing the Filipinos 
in racial terms. Americans defined themselves as a people who conquer and govern; 
they defined the Filipinos as a people incapable of civilization and political life. 206 
Americans believed themselves a race entitled to protection under European codes of 
war and law; Filipinos were placed outside the umbrella of these protections. Often the 
soldiers and reporters described the enemy as Indians-a vision very much in keeping 
McEnroe I OS 
with the notion of the Philippines as an unsettles zone, analogous to the American 
frontier. Yet, just as the notion of frontier merged with the notion of colony, the image 
of "Indian" merged with that of "nigger." This habit of mind created a sense of 
continuity between the racial characteristics of the war and the history of the nation. If 
some nagging awareness of the contradictions between American political traditions 
and the current war emerged, it was quickly banished by the understanding that 
American historical praxis had excluded non-White peoples from membership in the 
polity. This colonial war was not so much a renunciation of America's republican 
ideals of social contract as it was a continuation of America's belief that the 
application of all such ideals should be qualified on the basis of race.207 
The changing circumstances of America's military activity in the Philippines 
during the year that the Oregon Volunteers served were difficult to understand and 
difficult to justify. Both the soldiers and the Oregonian writers responded to the 
shifting diplomatic and military circumstances by adjusting their understanding of the 
racial relationship between Americans and Filipinos. 
As distant observers, the Oregonian writers were initially able to consider 
different courses of action in the Philippines as hypothetical. Though the paper was 
never strongly sympathetic to the political aspirations of the Philippine Rebellion 
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against Spain, voices in the Oregonian did at first describe the nationalists in political 
terms. While America was still engaged in the fight with Spain, the Oregonian 
sometimes likened the nationalist rebels to primitive Indians and sometimes accorded 
them the status of political actors. This uncertainty in the characterization of the 
Filipinos was paralleled by an uncertainty in the description of America's political 
identity. Some editorial voices continued to oppose annexation on the basis of 
America's republican and anti-colonial tradition; some advanced realist arguments for 
expansion based on commerce and national security, and others connected the 
prospects for annexation to the race mission of America. However, once Spain was 
defeated and national policy had moved toward annexation, editorial appeals to 
America's revolutionary heritage ceased. The Oregonian took up the idea of Anglo-
American empire with enthusiasm, and for a time contemplated the virtues of 
benevolent colonialism. But when war finally broke out between the U.S. and 
Philippine Armies, all notion of Filipinos as political beings disappeared, and the 
benevolent vision of colonialism was discarded. The Filipinos were increasingly 
represented as savage Indians who could only be subdued with overwhelming force. 2ffi 
From the outset, the soldiers' perspectives were more personal.2()1) The Oregon 
Volunteers rarely deliberated over the alternative visions of American greatness that 
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occupied the Oregonian in the early months of the war. Yet, the shifting conditions of 
their deployment had a pronounced effect on their view of the racial landscape. From 
the moment they arrived, the soldiers described the human environment of the 
Philippines in accordance with a racial taxonomy- but it was an uncertain taxonomy. 
To be sure, the Filipinos were considered a lower order, but the soldiers likened them 
to a variety of other races in ways that admitted both affection and sympathy as well 
as condescension. 
When Spain, the shared adversary, was defeated, and once material conflicts 
between the American and Philippine armies became serious, the soldiers' vision of 
the natives changed for the worse. As war against the native forces began in earnest, 
the Oregon soldiers began to view themselves not as observers in land organized by 
race, but partisans in a struggle defined by race. In the spring of 1899, Oregon soldiers 
scarcely ever employed political or diplomatic terms in describing the war. After the 
war against the Filipinos began in February of 1899, their letters and diaries became a 
continuous record of racial hostility toward all the native inhabitants of the war zone. 
The war became one of racial retribution. Filipinos, regardless of age, gender, military 
status, or political affiliation were viewed in racial aggregate as the enemy-and as an 
enemy beyond the sympathy of civilization. 
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Oregon Soldiers. Glenn May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, 
Execution, and impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Wesport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1980); Richard Collin, Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, 
and Expansion: A New View of American Imperialism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University, 1985), 150. Consult the following additional sources for the perspectives 
of McKinley, Roosevelt, McArthur, and Taft William McKinley, Speeches and 
McEnroe122 
Addresses of William McKinley (New York: Doubleday and McClure, 1900), 256; 
Thomas Dyer, Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race (Baton Rouge: University of 
Louisiana, 1980); Theodore Roosevelt, Presidential Addresses and State Papers of 
Theodore Roosevelt (New York: P.F. Collier and Son, Kraus Reprint Co., 1970), 217, 
64, 569; Testimony of Arthur MacArthur, Senate Hearings, 136; Testimony of 
William Howard Taft, Senate Hearings, 44, 59, 124. 
2
rn Beisner argues persuasively that most of the so-called imperialists and anti-
imperialists of 1898-9 shared the same general view of race and the same general goal 
of expanding national economic power abroad, Beisner, conclusion. 
208 For an historiographic review of claims regarding Americans' idealist and realist 
motives in the Spanish-American-Philippine War, see Perez, 36-8. 
209 Stuart Creighton Miller contends that American soldiers were focused on national 
honor and victory, but were little concerned with the future of the islands. He notes 
that many soldiers were enthusiastic about executing orders to commit horrible 
atrocities. Yet, Miller does not conceive of the struggle as essentially racial in its 
psychology. The papers of Oregon Soldiers suggest that they focused on personal 
opportunities more than national ones, but also that they were intent upon America's 
retention of the islands. They were animated by a racial hostility that went far beyond 
Miller's conception of the soldiers' nationalism. Miller, The American Soldier and the 




Agoncillo, Teodore A. History of the Filipino People. Revised ed. Quezon City, 
Philippines: Maylaya Books, 1967. 
Robert Beisner, Twelve Against the Empire: The Anti-Imperialists I898-I900. 
Chicago: University of Chicago, 1985. 
Brown, Charles H. The Correspondents' War: Journalists in the Spanish-American 
War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967). 
Collin, Richard. Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy, and Expansion: A New 
View of American Imperialism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 
1985. 
Cosmas, Graham A. An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-
American War. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri, 1971. 
Damiani, Brian P. Advocates of Empire: William McKinley, the Senate and American 
Expansion, I 898-I 899. Foreign Economic Policy of the United States. New 
York: Garland Publishing, 1987. 
Dodds, Gordon B. The American Northwest: A History of Oregon and Washington. 
Wheeling, Ill.: Forum Press, 1986. 
Dodson, W.D.B. "Official History of the Operations of the Second U.S.V. Infantry" 
in The Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish War and 
Philippine Insurrection. Compiled by Brigadier-General C. U. Gantenbein, 
(Salem, Ore: W.H. Leeds, State Printer, 1902. 
Dyer, Thomas. Theodore Roosevelt, and the Idea of Race. Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
State University, 1980. 
McEnroel24 
Gates, John Morgan. School Books and Krags: The United States Army in the 
Philippines, 1898-1902. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973. 
Gatewood, Willard B. Black Americans and the White Man's Burden, 1898-1903. 
Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1975. 
Healy, David. U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the I890s. Madison, Wisc: 
University of Wisconsin, 1970. 
Hoganson, Kristen L. Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics 
Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine Wars. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998. 
LaFeber, Walter. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-
1898. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963. 
Morgan, H. Wayne. America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas 
Expansion. America in Crisis, Edited by Robert A. Divine. New York: John 
Wiley, 1967. 
Linn, Brian McAllister. The Philippine War, 1899-1902. Lawrence, Kans.: University 
Press of Kansas, 2000. 
May, Glenn. Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact 
of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1980. 
Miller, Stuart Creighton. "The American Soldier and the Conquest of the Philippines." 
In Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine-American 
History. Edited by Peter Stanley. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1984. 
Miller, Stuart Creighton. "Benevolent Assimilation": The American Conquest of the 
Philippines, 1899-1903. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982. 
McEnroel25 
Offner, John, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain 
Over Cuba, 1896-1898. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 
1992. 
Perez, Louis A. The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and 
Historiography. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1998. 
Prucha, Francis Paul. The Great White Father: The United States Government and the 
American Indians. Abridged edition . Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska, 
1984. 
Published Primary Sources: 
American Imperialism and The Philippine Insurrection: Testimony Taken from 
Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands before the Senate Committee on 
the Philippines-1902. Edited by Henry F. Graff Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1969. 
Congressional Record, Containing the Proceedings and Debates of the Fifty-fifth 
Congress, Second Session, vol XXXL Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1898 
Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain Including the Insurrection in the 
Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, between the Adjutant-
General of the Army and Military Commanders in the United States, Cuba, 
Porto Rico, China, and the Philippine Islands, from April 15, 1898, to July 30, 
1902. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902. 
Gatewood, Willard B. "'Smoked Yankees' and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from 
Negro Soldiers, 1898-1902. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1971. 
McKinley, William. Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley. New York: 
Doubleday and McClure, 1900. 
McEnroel26 
Oregonian (Portland). 1895-1899. 
Otis, Elwell. "Report of Major General E. S. Otis ... Manila, Aug. 31, 1999." In The 
Official Records of the Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish War and Philippine 
Insurrection. Compiled by Brigadier-General C. U. Gantenbein. Salem, Ore: 
W.H. Leeds, State Printer, 1902. 
Roosevelt, Theodore. Presidential Addresses and State Papers of Theodore Roosevelt. 
New York: P.F. Collier and Son, Kraus Reprint Co., 1970. 
The Soldier's Letter, Vol I, Nov 1898. Albert Southwick papers, MSS 2714, Oregon 
Historical Society, Portland, Oregon. 
Telfer, George M. Manila Envelopes: Oregon Volunteer Lt. George M. Telfer's 
Spanish American War Letters. Edited by Sara Bunnet. Portland, Ore.: Oregon 
Historical Society Press, 1987. 
Thompson, H.C. "War Without Medals." Oregon Historical Quarterly, 59(4): 293-
325. 
Rost, James Stanley. The Oregon Volunteers in the Spanish-American war and 
Philippine Insurrection: The Annotated Diary of Chris A Bell. M.A. Thesis 
Portland State University, 1991. 
Manuscripts: 
Chriss A. Bell. Correspondence and diary, MSS 2930, Oregon Historical Society, 
Portland, Oregon. 
Joseph G. Evans. Journal and Correspondence, MSS 2449, Oregon Historical Society, 
Portland, Oregon. 
Edward E. Kelly. Personal Papers, MSS 1434, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, 
Oregon. 
McEnroel27 
Charles Henry Martin. Letters from the Philippines, MSS 1153, Oregon Historical 
Society, Portland, Oregon. 
George Lemon Newell. Papers, 1898-1901, MSS 2550, Oregon Historical Society, 
Portland, Oregon. 
Willis Arthur Platts. Diary 1898-9, MSS 376, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, 
Oregon. 
Elliot Rodgers. Journal, MSS 2628, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon. 
Albert M. Southwick. Papers, MSS 2714, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, 
Oregon. 
George F. Telfer. Correspondence, MSS 2635, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, 
Oregon. 
